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Abstract App stores include an increasing amount of user feedback in form of
app ratings and reviews. Research and recently also tool vendors have proposed
analytics and data mining solutions to leverage this feedback to developers and
analysts, e.g., for supporting release decisions. Research also showed that positive
feedback improves apps’ downloads and sales figures and thus their success. As
a side effect, a market for fake, incentivized app reviews emerged with yet un-
clear consequences for developers, app users, and app store operators. This paper
studies fake reviews, their providers, characteristics, and how well they can be
automatically detected. We conducted disguised questionnaires with 43 fake re-
view providers and studied their review policies to understand their strategies and
offers. By comparing 60,000 fake reviews with 62 million reviews from the Apple
App Store we found significant differences, e.g., between the corresponding apps,
reviewers, rating distribution, and frequency. This inspired the development of a
simple classifier to automatically detect fake reviews in app stores. On a labelled
and imbalanced dataset including one-tenth of fake reviews, as reported in other
domains, our classifier achieved a recall of 91% and an AUC/ROC value of 98%.
We discuss our findings and their impact on software engineering, app users, and
app store operators.
Keywords fake reviews · app reviews · user feedback · app stores
1 Introduction
In app stores, users can rate downloaded apps on a scale from 1 to 5 stars and write
a review message. Thereby, they can express satisfaction or dissatisfaction, report
bugs, or suggest new features (Carreno and Winbladh, 2013; Pagano and Maalej,
2013; Maalej et al., 2016a). Similar to other online stores, before downloading an
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app, users often read through the reviews. Research found that ratings and reviews
correlate with sales and download ranks (Harman et al., 2012; Pagano and Maalej,
2013; Svedic, 2015; Martin et al., 2016; Finkelstein et al., 2017). Stable numerous
ratings lead to higher downloads and sales numbers.
As a side effect, an illegal market for fake app reviews has emerged, with the
goal to offer services that help app vendors improve their ratings and ranking in
app stores. According to app store operators, in regular app reviews, real users
are supposed to be triggered by their satisfaction or dissatisfaction of using the
app to provide feedback. Fake reviewers, however, get paid or similarly rewarded
to submit reviews. They might or might not be real users of the app. Their review
might or might not be correct and reflecting their opinion.
We refer to this type of non-spontaneous, requested, and rewarded reviews
as fake reviews. Fake reviews are prohibited in popular app stores such as in
Google Play (Google, 2017) or Apple App Store (Apple, 2017). For instance, Apple
states: ”If we find that you have attempted to manipulate reviews, inflate your chart
rankings with paid, incentivized, filtered, or fake feedback, or engage with third party
services to do so on your behalf, we will take steps to preserve the integrity of the
App Store, which may include expelling you from the Developer Program.”.
Recently, Google highlighted the negative effects of fake reviews in an offi-
cial statement and explicitly asks developers to not buy and users to not accept
payments to provide fake reviews (Google, 2019). Even governmental competition
authorities started taking actions against companies using fake reviews to embel-
lish their apps. For instance, the Canadian telecommunication provider Bell was
fined $1.25 million (9to5Mac, 2017) for faking positive reviews to their apps. Vice
versa, the CNN app was affected by thousands of negative fake reviews to decrease
its rating and ranking within the Apple App Store (DigitalTrends, 2018).
While the phenomena of fake participation (e.g., in form of commenting, report-
ing or reviewing) is well-known in domains such as online journalism (Lee et al.,
2010; Ferrara et al., 2014; Dickerson et al., 2014; Subrahmanian et al., 2016) or
on business and travel portals (Jindal and Liu, 2008; Ott et al., 2011; Feng et al.,
2012; Mukherjee et al., 2013b), it remains understudied in software engineering –
in spite of recent significant research on app store analysis and feedback analytics
(Martin et al., 2016).
Fake reviews threaten the integrity of app stores. If real users don’t trust the
reviews, they probably will refrain from reading and writing reviews themselves.
This can result into a problem for app store operators, as app reviews is a central
concept of the app store ecosystem. Fake reviews can have negative implications
for app developers and analysts as well. Numerous software and requirements
engineering researchers studied app reviews, e.g., to derive useful development
information such as bug reports (Khalid, 2013; Maalej et al., 2016a) or to under-
stand and steer the dialogue between users and developers (Iacob and Harrison,
2013; Oh et al., 2013; Johann et al., 2017; Villarroel et al., 2016). Further, re-
searchers (Carreno and Winbladh, 2013; Chen et al., 2014; Maalej et al., 2016b)
and more recently tool vendors (AppAnnie, 2017) suggested tools that derive ac-
tionable information for software teams from reviews such as release priorities and
app feature co-existence. None of these works considers fake reviews and their im-
plications. Negative fake reviews, e.g., by competitors reporting false issues, can
lead to confusion and waste of developers’ time. Positive fake reviews might also
lead to wrong insights about real users needs and requirements.
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In this paper, we study fake app reviews, focusing on three research questions:
RQ1 How and by whom are app ratings and reviews manipulated?
Through online research and an investigative disguised questionnaire, we
identified 43 fake review providers and gathered information about their
fake reviewing strategies and offers.
RQ2 How do fake reviews differ from regular app reviews?
We crawled ∼60,000 fake reviews, empirically analyzed and compared
them with ∼62 million official app reviews from the Apple App Store. We
report on quantitative differences of fake reviewers and concerned apps.
RQ3 How accurate can fake reviews be automatically detected?
We developed a supervised classifier to detect fake reviews. Within an
in-the-wild experiment, we evaluated the performance of multiple classifi-
cation algorithms, configurations, and classification features.
In Section 2 we introduce the research questions, method, and data. We then
report on the results along the research questions: fake review market in Section 3,
characteristics in Section 4, and automated detection in Section 5. Afterwards, we
discuss the implications and limitations of our findings in Section 6. Finally, we
survey related work in Section 7 and conclude the paper in Section 8.
2 Study Design
We first introduce our research questions. Then, we describe our research method
and data along the data collection, preparation, and analysis phase.
2.1 Research Questions
We aim to qualitatively and quantitatively understand fake app reviews including
their market, characteristics, and potential automated detection. In the following
we detail our research questions by listing the sub-questions we aim to answer.
RQ1 Fake review market reveals how app sales and downloads are manipu-
lated and to which conditions. We investigate the following questions:
1. Providers: By whom are fake reviews offered? What strategies do
fake review providers follow?
2. Offers: What exact services do fake review providers offer and
under which conditions?
3. Policies: What are providers policies for submitting fake reviews?
Do these reveal indicators to detect fake reviews?
RQ2 Fake review characteristics reveal empirical differences between official
and fake reviews, including reviewed apps and reviewers.
1. Apps: Which apps are typically affected by fake reviews? What
are their categories, prices, and deletion ratio?
2. Reviewers: What is a typical fake reviewer, e.g., in terms of number
of reviews provided and review frequency?
3. Reviews: How do official and fake reviews differ, e.g., with regard
to rating, length, votes, submission date, and content?
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RQ3 Fake review detection examines how well supervised machine learning
algorithms can detect fake reviews. We focus on the following questions:
1. Features: Which machine learning features can be used to auto-
matically detect fake reviews?
2. Classification: Which machine learning algorithms perform best to
classify reviews as fake/non-fake?
3. Optimization: How can classifiers further be optimized? What is the
relative importance of the classification features?
4. In-the-Wild
Experiment:
How do the classifiers perform in practice on imbal-
anced datasets with different proportional distributions
of fake and regular reviews?
2.2 Research Method and Data
Our research method consists of a data collection, preparation, and analysis phase,
as depicted in Figure 1. We detail on each of the three phases in the following.
2.2.1 Data Collection Phase
For this study we collected two datasets: an official reviews dataset including app
metadata and reviews from the Apple App Store; as well as a fake reviews dataset
including metadata of apps affected by fake reviews, and fake reviews itself.
The official reviews dataset created in March 2017 consists of 1,430,091
apps, their metadata, and reviews. To collect the data, we implemented a dis-
tributed crawling tool using GoLang based on iTunes APIs, which we deployed
on hundreds of cloud servers. The data collection included three steps. First, we
crawled a list of all app identifiers available on the Apple App Store of the United
States, as we focus on English reviews. Second, we obtained the metadata for each
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Fig. 1 Research method including data collection, preparation, and analysis phases.
Towards Understanding and Detecting Fake Reviews in App Stores 5
Fig. 2 Screenshot of a fake review provider, offering a) app developers to buy reviews and
b) non-/developers to sign-up and write rewarded reviews. Section c) shows a list of apps
requesting fake reviews against monetary reward (obfuscated by the authors).
app, including the category, price, and number of reviews, using the iTunes Search
API1. Last, we retrieved the app reviews using an internal iTunes API.
Overall, the Apple App Store included 207,782,199 ratings of which 67,727,914
(24.6%) have a review. We were able to crawl 62,617,037 (92.4%) of these reviews,
as iTunes does not allow to receive more than 30,000 reviews per app. The size of
the dataset is 36.58 GB. The crawled reviews were written by 25,333,786 distinct
reviewers, i.e., users with different Apple IDs2. On average every reviewer submits
around 2.47 reviews. The oldest app review was entered on 10/07/2008, therefore
our dataset spans for nearly 9 years.
The fake reviews dataset was collected in April 2017 following three steps.
First, we identified 43 fake review providers by performing a structured manual
Google web search. To identify relevant search terms, we initially searched for
the phrase “buy app reviews”. We extracted related search terms suggested by
the search engine. For those we repeated the previous step, resulting in 39 unique
search terms, which are included in the replication package. Afterwards, we crawled
the results of the ten first pages for each search term. We removed duplicate
results and marked each result as fake review provider, relevant discussion about
fake reviews (e.g., in forums), or irrelevant result. From relevant discussions we
extracted additional fake review providers by reading through all sub-pages of the
discussions. Then, we manually extracted the provider’s offers from their websites.
In the second step, we conducted a disguised questionnaire to collect initial
indicators for fake reviews such as the minimum star-rating and length. The
questionnaire was presented as a request for buying fake reviews and sent to all
providers per email on 26/04/20173. For providers offering users to sign-up as fake
reviewers to exchange or get paid for providing fake reviews, we created accounts
and extracted the policies submitted fake reviews must comply with (cf. Figure 2).
1https://affiliate.itunes.apple.com/resources/documentation/itunes-store-web-service-
search-api/
2https://appleid.apple.com/faq/#!&page=faq
3Conducted with permission of the Ethics Committee of the University of Hamburg.
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Table 1 Overview of collected fake reviews and apps affected per provider (extracted using
the listed approaches, dashes indicate that no apps or reviews could be extracted).
Provider Id Provider Type # Apps # Reviews Approach
PRP10 Paid Review Provider 77 - Crawl
PRP16 Paid Review Provider 19 4 Crawl, Social
PRP21 Paid Review Provider 3 - Social
PRP25 Paid Review Provider - 3 Social
PRP26 Paid Review Provider - 10 Social
PRP28 Paid Review Provider - 3 Social
REP1 Review Exchange Portal 268 - Crawl
REP2 Review Exchange Portal 277 - Crawl
REP3 Review Exchange Portal 2,007 60,411 API, Crawl
REP5 Review Exchange Portal 7 - Crawl
REP6 Review Exchange Portal 9 - Crawl
REP8 Review Exchange Portal 182 - Crawl
REP9 Review Exchange Portal 4 - Crawl∑
= 2,853
∑
= 60,431
In the third and last step, we collected the fake review data, i.e., lists of apps
requesting fake reviews and fake reviews itself. For this, we used three approaches:
1. Social investigation, i.e., asking the providers for fake review examples, while
pretending to be interested in their services. We contacted the providers via
email or live-chats on their websites. Using this strategy we received 3 apps
and 20 fake reviews from 5 providers.
2. Crawling, for providers offering to sign-up as fake reviewers, we checked if the
lists of apps requesting fake reviews are available (see Figure 2, part c). To
extract the apps we implemented crawlers. A sample crawler is included in the
replication package. Overall, we collected 2,850 apps from 9 providers.
3. APIs, we found that providers require reviewers to upload screenshots of their
reviews as a proof. We searched for publicly accessible screenshots and down-
loaded them. Based on this, we gathered 60,411 reviews from a single provider.
Overall we identified 2,853 apps and 60,431 reviews from 13 providers,
see Table 1. Per provider the number of extracted apps and reviews is given, in
case we could successfully apply at least one of the introduced approaches. The
size of the collected data is 11.29 GB. We refer to this as unfiltered fake data
(cf. Figure 1), as it needs to be prepared for further analysis. For example, reviews
within the dataset could have already been removed from the app store. For data
preparation and analysis, all data, except the screenshots, is persisted as Parquet
files and analyzed with Apache Zeppelin and Spark4.
4https://zeppelin.apache.org/
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Fig. 3 Screenshots of fake reviews before submission to the app store used as proof for fake
review providers, depicting a) fake review included in our study, b) cut-off fake review excluded
from the study, and c) non-English fake review also excluded from the study.
2.2.2 Data Preparation Phase
Most fake reviews were collected in form of screenshots as shown in Figure 3.
We converted the screenshots into text using the Tesseract OCR engine5. We
removed incomplete reviews that do not include a full readable title and body,
e.g., if the title was outside the screen’s visible area. Then, we used the Language
Identification (LangID) library6 to retrieve fake reviews in English language only.
We removed 7,445 reviews (12.32%) resulting in 52,986 fake reviews in English
language.
Since the screenshots show the review edit screens before submitting the re-
views to the app store, we further filtered the collected fake reviews for three
possible reasons. First, we cannot assure that the reviews were actually submit-
ted. Second, the reviews could have not been unlocked by the app store operator.
Third, the reviews could have been deleted. Therefore, we only considered fake
reviews that have been published to and still exist within the Apple App Store,
i.e., which we could identify in the official reviews dataset as well.
For uniquely identifying (i.e., matching) reviews from the fake reviews dataset
within the official reviews dataset, we removed duplicate reviews which consist of
the same title and body within both datasets. Thereby, we removed 4,298 (8.11%)
fake reviews leaving 48,688 items. The percentage of duplicate reviews within the
official reviews dataset is with 16.08% nearly twice as high, which may be an indi-
cator for the high diversity of fake reviews. We performed the matching using exact
text comparison and by comparing the reviews’ Levensthein distances. We used
the Levensthein distance as single characters on the screenshots were sometimes
not parsed correctly by the OCR engine. We searched for all fake reviews within
the official reviews dataset by using an edit distance of up to 10 characters. For
possible matches identified using the Levensthein distance, we manually verified if
one of the suggested pairs is a match using two human annotators comparing the
screenshot of the fake review and the possible matches. In case of disagreements
(3% of all cases), a third annotator resolved the conflict. We matched 6,020 re-
views by exact text comparison and 2,584 reviews by comparing the Levensthein
distance.
5https://github.com/tesseract-ocr/tesseract
6https://github.com/saffsd/langid.py
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Table 2 Overview of the official and the fake reviews datasets.
Official Reviews Dataset Fake Reviews Dataset
# of reviews 62,617,037 8,607
# of apps 1,430,091 1,929
# of reviewers 25,333,786 721
Overall, we were able to identify 8,607 of the 60,431 (14.2%) collected fake re-
views within the Apple App Store. These reviews were extracted from 5 providers.
We also matched apps affected by fake reviews against the official reviews dataset,
as the apps might not be available in the US App Store or might have been
deleted. Of the 2,853 collected apps we found 2,174 apps (76.2%) in the official
reviews dataset. Further, we identified 898 additional apps by extracting the app
identifiers from previously matched fake reviews, resulting in 3,072 apps. We re-
moved all apps that did not receive reviews within the app store, resulting in 1,929
of 3,072 (62.8%) apps provided by 10 different providers. Finally, we identified 721
fake reviewers, i.e., accounts of persons submitting fake reviews to the app store,
by extracting their user identifiers from fake reviews.
In summary, after data cleaning the fake reviews dataset consists of 43
providers and structural information about their offers and policies, as well as
8,607 fake reviews, 1,929 apps affected by fake reviews, and 721 fake
reviewers. The dataset spans for nearly 7 years, as the oldest fake review was
entered on 16/10/2010. Table 2 summarizes the official and fake reviews datasets.
2.2.3 Data Analysis Phase
The data analysis phase consists of three steps which respectively answer the
research questions. To answer our first research question regarding the fake review
market, we analyzed the qualitative data aggregated from the providers’ websites,
collected during the questionnaire, and extracted from the review policies.
To explore the fake review characteristics we applied a statistical analysis of
the reviews, apps, and reviewers. We compare the figures from the fake reviews
dataset to those from the official reviews dataset and run statistical tests when-
ever applicable. For example, we found that most fake reviews are provided for
games. While regular apps receive most reviews on the day of an app release, apps
affected by fake reviews receive most reviews eleven days after the update. This
could indicate that apps affected by fake reviews do not have a real users basis that
intrinsically provides reviews in reaction to changes introduced by app updates.
Further, we found that fake reviewers provide twelve times as much reviews, with
a four times higher frequency. Also, fake reviews have more positive ratings com-
pared to official reviews, however the biggest difference exists between the amount
of 1-star ratings.
To detect fake reviews, we created a labeled and balanced dataset of fake
reviews and official reviews and used it to train and evaluate multiple classifiers,
based on machine learning features that we derived from the analysis of charac-
teristics. We conducted a hyperparameter tuning of the classifiers and evaluated
the importance of the classification features. Finally, we performed an in-the-wild
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Fig. 4 A fake review request with predefined rating and review on a review exchange portal.
experiment to get more realistic results of how the classifiers perform in practice.
Therefore, we used imbalanced datasets of fake and regular reviews. We varied
the skewness of the datasets between 90% to 0.1% fake reviews and compared the
classification results.
We detail each of these analysis steps in the following chapters. To support
replication, our dataset and the analyses source code as Zeppelin notebooks are
publicly available on our website7.
3 Fake Review Market (RQ1)
This section describes fake review providers and their market strategies, as well
as offers and pricing models. Afterwards, pretended characteristics of fake reviews
are summarized based on the results of the disguised questionnaire and analysis
of reviewing policies.
3.1 Review Providers and Market Strategies
We identified 43 providers offering fake reviews. These can be separated into two
groups by their strategies used to supply reviews.
Paid review providers (PRP) accept payments to provide fake re-
views. This applies for 34 out of 43 (79%) providers. User can select a package of,
e.g., 50 reviews, specify their app name and identifier, and purchase it via Paypal
or similar services. Afterwards, the fake reviews are submitted to the app store.
7https://mast.informatik.uni-hamburg.de/app-review-analysis/
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Fig. 5 Fake reviewing strategies.
Review exchange portals (REP) allow app developers to sign-up
and exchange reviews. The remaining 9 providers (21%) belong to this group.
After sign-up developers browse through a list of apps requesting fake reviews.
Figure 4 shows a sample request for fake reviews. Depending on their policies,
review exchange portals ask users to submit fake reviews, e.g., with predefined
ratings and review messages. For each fake review the developer submits, one
credit is given as a reward. Developers with at least one credit can add their app
to the list. Then, the credits are redeemed into reviews written by other developers.
In some cases, review exchange portals allow developers to buy credits and
non-developers to sign-up and submit fake reviews. Non-developers are rewarded
using micro-payments, typically between $0.20 to $1.50 per fake review.
Figure 5 shows the strategies of the fake review providers. After deciding to buy
fake reviews at a paid review provider or to exchange (or buy) reviews at a review
exchange portal, the developer provides basic information, such as the application
identifier and whether the reviews should be positive or negative. Optionally, fur-
ther information, such as keywords to be included within the reviews or predefined
review messages, can be submitted. Using this information, the provider creates a
review request (see, e.g., Figure 4).
Review exchange portals publish these requests on their internal platform to
recruit fake reviewers. For paid review providers the publishing process is not trans-
parent. Using social investigation and by offering our service as fake reviewer, we
identified that at least five providers publish their review requests on invite-only
Slack or Telegram channels. By observing the communication within these chan-
nels, we found that paid review providers occasionally cross-post review requests
on review exchange portals while offering micro payments.
Fake reviewers can browse through and assign review requests to themselves.
Afterwards, they are presented a review policy that regulates what information or
rating the review should include. The fake reviewer submits an appropriate fake
review to the app store. As a proof, the fake reviewer uploads a screenshot of the
review edit screen showing their rating and review to the provider.
Last, the provider compares if the provided review meets the reviewing policy.
If this applies, and the review has been published within the app store, the fake
reviewer is rewarded. Reviewers providing reviews that do not meet the policies
are excluded from the channels or portals and are not rewarded.
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Table 3 Offers and prices (in US$) of paid review providers.
PRP Co. Review Price Rating Price Install Price
iOS Android iOS Android iOS Android
Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max
1 IN 1.35 1.50
2 DK 4.63 4.90 0.98 1.00 0.25 0.25 0.05 0.06
3 IN 0.25 0.25 0.20 0.20 0.09 0.09
4 IN 1.50 1.98
5 GB 1.11 1.50 0.10 0.10
6 US 2.90 2.95 1.28 1.58 1.30 1.36
7 RU 0.25 0.25 0.20 0.20 0.10 0.10
8 US 6.00 9.00 6.00 9.00
9 US 3.33 4.17 1.00 1.50 0.09 0.15
10 NL 1.55 1.55 1.00 1.00 0.65 0.65 0.20 0.20
11 US 2.50 4.00 3.50 5.00 0.49 0.90 0.08 0.12
12 CA 1.00 1.00
13 US 2.15 2.50 1.59 2.50 0.34 0.46 0.13 0.20
14 US 4.30 5.00 0.85 1.20 0.35 0.38 0.35 0.38
15 IN 0.15 0.15 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.10
16 RU 2.09 2.99 2.99 2.99
17 US 5.02 5.20 2.00 2.60 0.40 0.45 0.40 0.46
18 DE 2.50 2.50 0.17 0.17
19 US 8.69 10.00 3.60 4.00 1.28 1.60 1.36 1.58
20 VN 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.10 0.05 0.05
21 US 2.00 2.00 1.40 2.00
22 US 1.45 2.00 0.29 0.32 0.08 0.15
23 RU 3.40 4.00 2.75 2.75
24 US 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.15 0.15
25 NL 1.78 3.30 1.78 3.30 0.50 0.50 0.08 0.10
26 RU 3.00 3.00
27 IN 1.99 2.40 0.39 0.46 0.39 0.46
28 CN 2.09 2.99 2.39 2.99 1.00 1.99
29 SG 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
30 DE 1.93 4.00 0.45 0.50 0.06 0.14
31 US 1.00 2.00 0.50 1.00
32 IN 0.50 0.50
33 AE 0.90 1.00 0.75 0.80 0.15 0.40
34 IN 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.60 1.67 1.60 1.67
NUM 17 17 32 32 2 2 10 10 12 12 23 23
AVG 3.41 4.24 1.73 2.14 1.50 2.00 0.76 0.83 0.48 0.55 0.33 0.40
SD 1.85 2.21 1.24 1.70 0.71 0.01 0.64 0.71 0.38 0.40 0.45 0.50
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3.2 Offers and Pricing Models
To increase app downloads and sales, paid review providers offer fake reviews,
ratings, and installs. Table 3 shows the prices of these offers for both the Android
and iOS platform. The table lists the offers’ minimum and maximum price, which
varies, e.g., depending on the amount of reviews bought.
Paid fake reviews are offered by 17 of 34 (50%) providers for iOS and by 32 of
34 (94.1%) for Android. Reviews always include a rating. Among all offers, reviews
are the most expensive. The price of a review for iOS is, on average, between $3.41
and $4.24 with a standard deviation from 1.85 to 2.21. The price of a review for
Android is less expensive, on average, between $1.73 and $2.14 with a standard
deviation from 1.73 to 2.14. The price for iOS is ∼97 to 98% higher.
Paid fake ratings are offered by two of 34 (5.9%) providers for iOS and by
10 of 34 (29.4%) for Android. With this offer fake reviewers rate the app without
submitting a written review. The price of a rating for iOS is on average between
$1.50 and $2.00 with a standard deviation from 0.01 to 0.71. The price of a rating
for Android is on average between $0.76 to $0.83 with a standard deviation of 0.76
to 0.83. Compared to Android the price for iOS ratings is ∼97 to 140% higher.
Paid installs are generated, e.g., by advertising the app on blogs. Also, users
can be paid to install the app. The acquired new app users decide by themselves
to rate and review the app. According to our definition these reviews are not
considered as fake, as these are not directly requested or paid for. Installs are
offered by 12 of 34 (35.4%) providers for iOS and by 23 of 34 (67.6%) for Android.
Among all offers installs are the least expensive. The price of an iOS app install
is between $0.48 to $0.55 with a standard deviation of 0.38 to 0.40. For Android
the price is between $0.33 to $0.40 with a standard deviation of 0.45 to 0.50.
Comparing both platforms the price difference is ∼37 to 45%.
Overall, the offers are rather expensive, e.g., compared to an average crowd-
sourcing task or buying followers on Twitter. 10,000 Twitter followers can be
bought for a price of $4 (Stringhini et al., 2013). This might depend on the fact that
fake ratings and reviews are generated manually, e.g., due to a strict moderation
by app store operators, while Twitter followers can be generated automatically.
We further tried to identify the popularity of the three different types of of-
fers. Unfortunately, we were only able to extract usage numbers from paid review
provider 10 (PRP10) and thus cannot provide generalizable information. Overall,
this provider sold 354,000 offers, of which 20,750 (5.9%) were fake reviews, 29,150
(8.2%) fake ratings, and 304,100 (85.9%) paid installs. We cannot give any num-
bers on how many paid installs result into a rating or review, and if these are
comparable to fake ratings and reviews.
3.3 Pretended Fake Review Characteristics
To understand the rules and conditions of providing fake reviews, we conducted
a disguised questionnaire with the paid review providers. We also extracted the
policies, with which submitted reviews must comply in review exchange portals.
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Table 4 Summary of disguised questionnaire showing offers of paid review providers.
PRP Positive
Ratings
Negative
Ratings
Custom
Keywords
Predefined
Reviews
Real Users Guarantee
9 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
10 Yes Yes Yes No
12 Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
15 Yes Yes No
16 Yes No Yes Yes Yes No
22 Yes Yes Yes
23 Yes No No Yes Yes No
25 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
26 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
28 Yes No No Yes Yes No
29 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
3.3.1 Disguised Questionnaire
The disguised questionnaire consists of eleven questions and was presented to
providers in a request for buying fake reviews. A sample question is shown below:
We have several competitors which gain more and more market share. For
this reason we are looking for both positive and negative reviews, positive
for our apps and negative for our competitors’ apps. [...]
We decided against open questions as we noticed during a pre-run of the ques-
tionnaire, conducted using different identities, that providers returned incomplete
answers. The questionnaire is included in our replication package.
Eleven out of 34 paid review providers (32.3%) answered our questionnaire.
Table 4 summarizes their answers. Even upon request, not all providers answered
all of our questions. Therefore, the total answers refer to the number of providers
that explicitly answered the specific question.
While all 11 providers offer positive ratings and reviews, 6 also offer negative,
e.g., to lower the reputation of competing apps. Regarding the content, 6 of 8
providers reported to accept keywords, which will be included in their reviews.
Seven of 8 providers accept predefined reviews to be submitted by their reviewers.
All providers state their reviews are written by humans and not generated using
algorithms. Five of 10 providers gave a guarantee to replace deleted fake reviews.
Regarding the geographical origin of fake reviews, PRP10 and PRP15 pro-
vide reviews from the US. PRP23 and PRP26 additionally provide reviews from
Russia. P25 also provides reviews from India. PRP28 specified 13 countries from
which the reviews are submitted, these are Austria, Canada, China, France, Ger-
many, India, Italy, Japan, Russia, Taiwan, United Kingdom, United States, and
Vietnam. Four providers (PRP9, PRP12, PRP16, and PRP29) reported to submit
reviews from all over the world. According to the results, the top three countries
reviews are provided from are: United States (54.5%), Russia (36.4%), and India
(18.2%). Regarding the language, PRP9 and PRP29 reported to provide reviews
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Table 5 Review characteristics extracted from policies of review exchange portals.
REP Co. Real
Dev.
Install
App
Use App Keep App Honest Rating Length Copy
1 IN Yes No 1-5
2 ES Yes Yes 5 days Yes 3-5 >10 words No
3 US Yes Yes 1-2 days Yes 2-3 sentences
4 US 1-2 sentences No
5 GB Yes Yes 1 day Yes 4-5 1-2 sentences
6 CN Yes Yes 4 min 5 days
7 GB Yes 1-2 sentences
8 SE Yes Yes 2 days Yes 3-5 >10 words No
9 RU Yes 10 min 7 days
in all languages. PRP10, PRP12, PRP15, PRP25, and PRP28 only provide re-
views in English. PRP23 and PRP26 also provide reviews in Russian language.
By analyzing all 60,431 fake reviews, initially collected, using LangID, we found
that these are written in 70 languages. The five most common are English (87.7%),
French (2.3%), German (2.2%), Italian (1.3%), and Spanish (1%).
3.3.2 Review Policies
For all review exchange portals, we were able to extract policies that state the
requirements submitted fake reviews have to confirm to, see Table 5. The policies
have different levels of details. Thus, not every requirement is stated by each policy.
With the total number we refer to the policies that explicitly state a requirement.
Five portals require to use a real device to submit a review. The installation
of the app is explicitly required by seven portals. Only two portals request the
reviewers to use the app before submitting a review. REP6 requires the reviewer
to use the app for at least 4 minutes and REP9 for at least 10 minutes. REP1
explicitly states that the usage of the app is not required. Six portals state that
the app should be kept on the phone for a specific amount of time after leaving the
review. The minimum amount of time is one (REP3, REP5) up to 7 days (REP9).
Regarding the rating, four providers specify a range the rating should follow.
REP2 and REP8 request 3-5 stars, and REP5 4-5 stars. REP1 is the only provider
explicitly allowing positive and negative (1-5 stars) ratings. However, reviews from
REP1 are not included in our fake reviews dataset. Five providers state that the
review should be honest, although three of those allow only positive ratings with
at least 3-4 stars. These providers state that reviewers should skip apps if they are
unable to submit a positive review.
Regarding the review length, six portals make a statement: two require at least
10 words, three portals 1-2 sentences, and one portal 2-3 sentences. Three providers
explicitly state that the review should not contain content copied from the app
description. REP5 and REP9 additionally require that the reviews are sufficiently
detailed, e.g., “should describe app features instead of providing only praise”.
REP2 allows reviewers to only rate up to 10 apps per day. Further, the app
should not be immediately reviewed after its installation. Reviewers should ran-
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domly download apps from the app store without leaving a review. Before leaving
another review the reviewer should wait a few minutes. Last, reviewers should not
only provide 5-star ratings, but vary between 3-5 star ratings. REP7 requires the
ratings to match review content. Finally, REP9 requires to launch reviewed apps
periodically within the next 7 days. A possible reason for this, might be to hide
the suspicious behavior of quitting to use an app after providing a positive review
from app store operators.
3.3.3 Initial Fake Review Indicators
Considering the questionnaire results, the review policies, and taking into account
the efforts of providers to disguise fake reviews, we can hypothesize that fake
reviews are highly diverse. For example, the rating of fake reviews can be positive
or negative. The length of a review can also vary. In addition, the quality of the
content may strongly differ. Overall, fake reviews do not mean short and low
quality reviews, as our initial results reveal. These reviews could be either written
by paid reviewers (whether or not they have to use specific keywords), or they can
be predefined reviews that are written by the app developers and that have to be
published by the reviewers.
4 Fake Review Characteristics (RQ2)
We investigate apps affected by fake reviews, reviewers providing fake reviews, and
fake reviews themselves. In particular, we study the differences of fake reviews to
the reviews from the official reviews dataset.
4.1 Apps
We identified 3,072 apps requesting fake reviews. As these apps could have, e.g.,
been entered on review exchange portals for testing purposes either or not by
their developers, we only consider apps that received fake reviews to strengthen
our results. Overall, we analyzed 1,929 (62.8%) of the identified apps.
Most apps with fake reviews fall into in the category games, nearly
twice as much as regular apps. Table 6 lists the 25 app categories of the Apple
App Store. It compares apps from the fake reviews and the official reviews dataset
per category. The table depicts each categories’ rank, number and percentage of
apps, and percentage of reviews within the datasets. The highest rank is assigned
to the category with the most apps included.
We found that more than half of the apps with fake reviews (53%) belong
to the category “Games”, followed by the categories “Photo & Video” (5.8%),
“Education” (4.8%), “Entertainment” (4.5%), and “Health & Fitness” (4.4%).
The categories with least apps with fake reviews are “Stickers” (0.05%), “News”
(0.1%), “Catalogs” (0.16%), “Newsstand” (0.16%), and “Books” (0.21%).
Between both datasets, we found a strong, positive correlation for the distri-
bution of apps over the categories. We compared the category ranks using the
Spearman rank correlation coefficient (rs = 0.74, two-tailed p-value = 0.00002).
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Table 6 Category ranking, number of apps, and percentage of reviews per category within
the fake reviews and official reviews dataset.
Category Fake Reviews Dataset Official Reviews Dataset
Rank Apps Reviews Rank Apps Reviews
Books 21 4 (0.21%) 0.06% 19 25069 (1.75%) 0.89%
Business 12 33 (1.71%) 1.72% 3 130825 (9.15%) 1.35%
Catalogs 23 3 (0.16%) 0.09% 23 10951 (0.77%) 0.29%
Education 3 92 (4.77%) 3.80% 2 131302 (9.18%) 1.74%
Entertainment 4 87 (4.51%) 4.03% 5 79504 (5.56%) 5.68%
Finance 17 17 (0.88%) 1.11% 14 34684 (2.43%) 1.66%
Food & Drink 15 19 (0.98%) 0.65% 9 50944 (3.56%) 1.34%
Games 1 1023 (53.03%) 47.57% 1 326864 (22.86%) 49.95%
Health & Fitn. 5 85 (4.41%) 5.81% 8 54410 (3.80%) 3.23%
Lifestyle 8 69 (3.58%) 4.82% 4 102183 (7.15%) 2.46%
Medical 20 13 (0.67%) 0.65% 16 30101 (2.10%) 0.42%
Music 11 36 (1.87%) 1.99% 11 43874 (3.07%) 2.72%
Navigation 20 13 (0.67%) 1.06% 20 21559 (1.51%) 0.80%
News 24 2 (0.10%) 0.06% 18 26358 (1.84%) 1.64%
Newsstand 23 3 (0.16%) 0.18% 25 1021 (0.07%) 0.00%
Photo & Video 2 112 (5.81%) 7.66% 12 40034 (2.80%) 6.54%
Productivity 10 42 (2.18%) 1.92% 10 44191 (3.09%) 3.35%
Reference 18 14 (0.73%) 0.63% 15 34465 (2.41%) 1.50%
Shopping 13 25 (1.30%) 2.50% 22 15253 (1.07%) 2.15%
Social Netw. 6 82 (4.25%) 3.69% 17 27488 (1.92%) 5.41%
Sports 9 45 (2.33%) 1.79% 13 37060 (2.59%) 1.14%
Stickers 25 1 (0.05%) 0.01% 21 20979 (1.47%) 0.01%
Travel 14 22 (1.14%) 2.08% 7 64846 (4.53%) 1.30%
Utilities 8 69 (3.58%) 4.69% 6 71680 (5.01%) 3.61%
Weather 16 18 (0.93%) 1.43% 24 4446 (0.31%) 0.82%∑
= 1,929
∑
= 1,430,091
The coefficient is used to measure the rank correlation, i.e., the statistical depen-
dence between the rankings of two variables.
To identify categories with the highest difference between both datasets, we
calculated the rank difference using the following formula.
rdiff = |rankofficial − rankfake| (1)
The highest differences exis for the categories “Social Networking” (rdiff=11 ),
“Photo & Video” (rdiff=10 ), “Business” (rdiff=9 ), and “Shopping” (rdiff=9 ). The
3rd category “Business” within the app store is, for example, only ranked 12th in
the fake reviews dataset. Vice versa, the category “Photo & Video” contains more
apps in the fake reviews dataset.
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Fig. 6 Distribution of fake and official reviews over ranges per app.
Apps with fake reviews are on average three times less offered as
paid, compared to regular apps. Developers might invest a lot of money buying
fake reviews. Therefore, we analyzed the monetization of apps in the fake reviews
dataset. We focused on the app price and in-app purchases.
Regarding the app price, we found that 1,799 apps (93.3%) are offered for free,
while 130 apps (6.7%) are paid. In comparison, the app store includes 1,167,377
(81.6%) free and 262,714 (18.4%) paid apps. The mean price of an app is $2.16
with a standard deviation of 2.5. For the app store the mean price is $4.07 with
a standard deviation of 16.7. This difference between the mean prices is statisti-
cally significant (two-sample t-test, p<0.001, CI=0.99). However, the magnitude
between the differences is slightly below small, found by calculating the effect size
(d=-0.160) (Cohen, 1988). Of the paid apps, 62 apps (47.7%, cf. 39.6% in app
store) are offered for $0.99, 39 apps (30%, cf. 18.9% in app store) for $1.99, and
16 apps (12.3%, cf. 16.2% in app store) for $2.99. The remaining apps (10%) cost
between $3.99-$24.99. In the app store the price of the remaining apps (25.4%) is
between $3.99-$999.99.
In-app purchases are offered by 759 fake-reviewed apps (39.4%). These apps
contain 3,845 in-app offers, of which 3,186 are in-app purchases. On average each
app includes around 4.2 in-app purchases with an average price of $10.46. 26.33%
of the in-app purchases are offered for $0.99, 26.9% are in the range of $1.99-$2.99,
26.6% in the range of $3.99-$9.99, and 20.2% in the range of $10.99-$399.99. We
were unable to automatically crawl in-app purchases, therefore we cannot compare
the figures from the fake reviews to the official reviews dataset.
Also, apps could be further monetized through advertisements. We were unable
to study this aspect, since no publicly available data on the number of advertise-
ment impressions and revenue generated per impression exists.
Most apps targeted by fake reviews have 2-9 reviews, which is the
case for 42.2% of all apps. We analyzed the total number of reviews for apps
affected by fake reviews and apps from the official reviews dataset. Figure 6 groups
both types of apps into given ranges of fake and official reviews. The result indicates
that fake reviews are not necessarily limited to a small and specific group of apps,
but could be distributed across the majority of apps.
Only less than 7% of apps affected by fake reviews were removed
from the Apple App Store. We studied whether apps with a high percentage
of fake reviews rather get removed from the app store, compared to apps with less
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Fig. 7 Ratio of fake reviews for non-/deleted apps.
fake reviews. Therefore, we crawled the apps affected by fake reviews again after
three months in June 2017. Of the 1,929 apps, 131 (6.8%) were no longer available
on the app store. Most of the deleted apps (68%) belong to the category “Games”,
5% to “Entertainment”, and 5% to “Utilities”. Since no justification is provided
by the app store operators, there are two possible reasons for this: Either, the
apps have been removed by their own developers, or the app store operators have
removed the app due to fake reviews or other compliance reasons, e.g., spam apps
(Seneviratne et al., 2017). Figure 7 shows two plots of deleted and non-deleted
apps and their percentage of fake reviews.
The upper plot considers all apps affected by fake reviews. We found that
deleted apps received 27.5% fake (median: 20%) and 72.5% official reviews. Non-
deleted apps received 38.1% fake (median: 30.8%) and 61.9% official reviews. By
analyzing the median, we found that non-deleted apps receive 12 reviews (cf. 15
reviews for deleted apps) of which 2 are fake (cf. 2 reviews for deleted apps). A
χ2-test showed that being no longer available on the app store and the percentage
of fake reviews are independent (χ2=2.0906, p=0.1482).
As this gives the impression that the amount of fake reviews does not impact
being removed from the app store, we further analyzed apps with at least ten fake
reviews only, see lower plot. This applies for 181 apps, of which 11 were deleted.
For these, the median of fake reviews for deleted apps is 63.5%. For non-deleted
apps the median is 37.1%. Based on medians, deleted apps receive 51 reviews of
which 22 are fake. Non-deleted apps receive 49.5 reviews of which 15 are fake. For
these apps, a χ2-test showed both values are no longer independent (χ2=6.8708,
p=0.008762), compared to considering all apps with at least one fake review.
4.2 Reviewers
Fake reviewers submit about 30 reviews on average — 12 times more
than regular reviewers. We identified 721 users providing fake reviews. These
fake reviewers provide 29.9 reviews per user, on average, compared to 2.5 reviews
per reviewer in the official reviews dataset. This difference is statistically signifi-
cant (two-sample t-test, p<0.001, CI=0.99) and the effect size is large (d=0.802).
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Fig. 8 Number of reviews provided per fake or official reviewer.
Overall, these users provided 21,581 reviews in total for 8,429 different apps. Sur-
prisingly, fake reviewers do not seem to use several accounts to hide their activities.
More than 50% of the reviewers in the official dataset provide only a
single review. The total number of reviews given per fake reviewer varies between
1 and 573. For reviewers within the official reviews dataset this is between 1 and
913. Figure 8 groups both fake and regular reviewers according to their number
of submitted reviews.
Exactly one review was given by 5.4% of the fake reviewers, compared to
53.1% for regular reviewers. 2-5 reviews were provided by 15.8% fake reviewers
(cf. 35.6%), 6-10 reviews by 20.8% (cf. 9.3%), 11-50 reviews by 40.8% (cf. 1.9%),
51-100 reviews by 11.8% (cf. 0.02%), and more than 100 reviews by 5.4% (cf.
0.006%). The highest percentage of fake reviewers (40.8%) is in the range of 11-50
reviews, while most regular reviewers (53.1%) provide a single review.
Fake reviewers review about 4 times more frequently than regular
reviewers. Fake reviewers are more active compared to others. They have a fre-
quency of one review per 78.8 days, compared to 328.9 days for regular reviewers.
The difference is statistically significant with 250.1 days, i.e., 417.2% (two-sample
t-test, p<0.001, CI=0.99). The effect size is large (d=-0.955).
The lifetime of fake reviewer accounts is nearly twice as long as
regular users. The account lifetime, i.e., the time difference between the first
and last review provided, is 622.3 days for fake reviewers, compared to 331.3 days
for other app store users. The difference between fake and regular reviewers is
291 days (187.9%) and statistically significant using the previous test (p<0.001,
CI=0.99). The effect size is near medium (d=0.464). This shows that the accounts
of fake reviewers remain undetected in app stores for several years.
4.3 Reviews
Although we found 60,431 fake reviews, in the following we only consider the 8,607
fake reviews that we identified and still exist in the Apple App Store. These reviews
have not been filtered by mechanism of the app store operators and could impact
app developers and users.
The distribution between ratings of fake and official reviews varies
most for 1-star reviews. Figure 9 compares the distribution of ratings for re-
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Fig. 9 Distribution of star ratings between official and fake reviews.
views from the fake and official reviews dataset. 70% of the fake reviews are rated
with 5 stars compared to 65% for official reviews. 23% of fake reviews are rated
with 4 stars (cf. 16%), 5% with 3 stars (cf. 6%), 1% with 2 stars (cf. 4%), and
0.6% with 1 star (cf. 10%). Overall, ratings are very positive in both datasets.
The greatest difference between fake and official reviews can be observed by the
percentage of 1-star ratings. We have evidence that fake review providers explicitly
ask their reviewers within reviewing policies to not only provide 5-stars reviews but
also 4-stars and even 3-stars reviews. This might result in rather small differences
between fake and official reviews regarding extremely positive ratings. Thereby,
the suspicious behavior of writing, and also receiving, only 5-stars reviews should
be hidden as this could possibly result in the deletion fake reviews by app store
operators and in worst case the removal of the affected app from the app store (cf.
Section 3.3.2).
Compared to official reviews, short reviews are rather uncommon
in fake reviews. The length of a fake review (consisting of title and body) is,
on average, 121.3 characters. Official reviews have a length of 110.8 characters, on
average – resulting in a difference of 10.5 characters. Considering the median, fake
reviews consist of 111 characters while official reviews consist of 63 characters, see
Figure 10. The difference regarding the median is 48 characters.
We further analyzed the number of words per review. Fake reviews have, on
average, 22.9 words, with a median of 21 words. Official reviews have 21.3 words,
with a median of 12 words. Regarding the amount of average words, the difference
is relatively small with 1.7 words. Considering the median the difference is 9 words.
A typical fake review is given below.
Great for expense tracking ? ? ? ? ?
Does a great job for expense tracking. Nice interface and color scheme.
Definitely recommend!
We found that rather short reviews, which constitute a major part of the official
reviews, are uncommon for fake reviews (see example below).
Fantastic ? ? ? ? ?
Great game, my son loves it. Lots of fun.
We initially assumed fake reviews to be short. However, according to the
dataset fake reviews are significantly longer regarding the number of characters
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Fig. 10 Distribution of review length (in characters) between regular and fake reviews.
and words (Wilcoxon rank sum test, p<0.001, CI=0.99). The effect size (Fritz
et al., 2012) however is near zero (r=0.001).
Fake reviews are rated more often helpful compared to official re-
views. In app stores users can rate the helpfulness of reviews through votes. 132
of the 8,607 fake reviews (1.5%) received at least one vote, compared to 2.7% for
reviews in the app store. Overall, the reviews received 270 votes. 245 are votes
(90.7%) rating the reviews as helpful and 25 votes (9.3%) rate the reviews not
helpful. In the app store less helpful votes (67.8%) exist. Both, the number of re-
views with votes and the overall number of helpful votes are significantly different
(two-sample t-test, p<0.001, CI=0.99). Also in this case, the effect size is near
zero (d=-0.018).
After releasing updates, apps affected by fake reviews do not imme-
diately receive more reviews. We analyzed the relative reviewing frequency
by summing up all reviews per day after the apps’ last releases. Figure 11 shows
the percentage of received reviews per day for apps affected by fake reviews and
regular apps over a time span of three weeks. After three weeks the amount of re-
ceived reviews stabilized. We choose only the apps’ last release as we were unable
to automatically crawl release dates.
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Fig. 11 Percentage of reviews received per day after app release (day 0 is release of app
update).
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Fig. 12 Delta between occurrences of most-common words in official/fake reviews, a negative
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denotes that the word is less common for fake reviews.
For regular apps most reviews are given on the day of the app release (Pagano
and Maalej, 2013). For apps affected by fake reviews there is only a small peak on
the app release day. For these apps the percentage of reviews provided increases
on a daily basis, until it decreases on day 11 after the app update. One reason
might be that for apps affected by fake reviews no large user basis exist that could,
intrinsically motivated, provide reviews. Developers of these apps have to buy fake
reviews to promote their updates. The distribution of request for providing fake
reviews to the actual reviewers might take time. Compared to that, regular apps
with a user basis that matches the amount of reviews received, have enough users
that spontaneously provide their feedback after installing the app update.
Fake reviews include more positives adjectives and less negative
words related to software engineering such as “fix” or “crash”. We an-
alyzed the review content by comparing the 100 most-common words of fake and
official reviews. We extracted the lists of most-common words in five steps. First,
we removed the punctuation. We transformed all words into lowercase writing.
Then, we tokenized the words of each review. We removed stopwords. Last, we
counted the occurrences of each word.
Both lists have 63 words in common and 37 unique words. We sorted the lists
descending by the occurrences of words. Afterwards, for each word the lists have
in common, we calculated the difference between their positions in the lists. The
word “simple” is, e.g., on position 14 for fake reviews and on position 97 for official
reviews, resulting in a rank of -83. Therefore, negative ranks denote words that
are more common for fake reviews. We plotted word ranks in Figure 12.
The top five words that are more common for fake reviews are “simple”, “su-
per”, “little”, “recommend”, and “well”. The top five words that are less common
for fake reviews are “even”, “can’t”, “don’t”, “want”, and “free”.
Afterwards, we analyzed the distinct words in both lists. For official reviews
the distinct five most common words are (in order): “update”, “ever”, “please”,
“fix”, “every”. Also, words possibly related to the functionality of the apps, such
as “doesn’t”, “crashes”, “wish”, and “bad” are included. The five most common
distinct words for fake reviews are: “graphics”, “useful”, “idea”, “ads”, and “kids”.
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Also positive words, such as “interesting”, “perfect”, “helpful”, “recommended”,
“funny”, and “learn” are popular.
Last, we compared the most common bi-grams for fake and official reviews.
As for most common words, again 63 matches exist. We observed that bi-grams
possibly pointing to bug reports, such as “please fix”, only exist in the official
reviews dataset. Bi-grams indicating feature requests, such as “would like” or
“wish could”, exist in both datasets. Negative bi-grams, such as “waste time” or
“keeps crashing”, again only exist within the official reviews dataset.
5 Fake Review Detection (RQ3)
We build a supervised binary classifier to classify reviews as fake or not. Figure 13
shows the three phases conducted after feature extraction. We begin by preprocess-
ing the data. Then, we compare the results of different classification algorithms.
We optimize the algorithms by feature selection and hyperparameter tuning. Last,
we evaluate the importance of the classification features. Afterwards, we conduct
an in-the-wild experiment to evaluate how our classifier performs in practice, i.e.,
on imbalanced data.
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Fig. 13 Overview of fake review classification.
5.1 Feature Extraction
We extracted a balanced truthset of 16,000 reviews. Of these reviews, 8,000 are
randomly selected fake and 8,000 are randomly selected official reviews. Per review,
the truthset includes a vector containing 15 numerical features and a label, which
is either “real” or “fake”. The features were selected based on the differences we
identified between fake and official reviews, and by experimentation. We decided
not to use the textual review itself, e.g., in form of TF/IDF representation, for
several reasons. Mukherjee et al. (Mukherjee et al., 2013b) analyzed fake reviews
published on Yelp and found that the word distribution of fake reviews does not
significantly differ from official reviews. As a result, their text-based classifier only
achieved an accuracy of 67.8%. Vice versa, the word distribution within fake re-
views could also highly differ. According to the questionnaire with paid review
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Table 7 Features selected for the classification of fake reviews.
Category Name Type Null-
Values
Example
Reviewer # Reviews (Total) Int 0 100
% Reviews (per Star-Rating) [Float] 0 [0.7, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.3]
Review Frequency (in Seconds) Int 1,734 100
Account Usage (in Seconds) Int 0 600
App # Reviews (Total) Int 0 100
# Reviews (per Star-Rating) [Float] 0 [0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2]
Review Length (in Characters) Int 0 100
providers, custom keywords can be included in the reviews or predefined reviews
can be submitted by the fake reviewers. Finally, when using text, training data
would be required for every language, which is difficult to collect.
In contrast, Ferrara et al. (Ferrara et al., 2014) use non-textual features related
to the user, such as the account creation time or total number of followers. By using
such features their classifier to detect bots in social networks that, e.g., influence
political discussions, achieved better results. Other researchers (Dickerson et al.,
2014; Lee et al., 2010; Feng et al., 2012; Park et al., 2016) followed this approach
and were also able to improve their classification results.
We therefore focused on features that relate to the context of the fake review,
i.e., the reviewer and app. Table 7 lists all selected features. For the reviewer we
selected four features: the total number of reviews provided, the percentage of
reviews per star rating (e.g., the reviewer could have provided 70% of all reviews
with a 5-star rating and 30% with a 1-star rating), the review frequency (i.e.,
the average time in seconds between all reviews provided), and the account usage
(which is the lifetime of the reviewers account, i.e., the timespan between the first
and the last review provided in seconds). For the app we selected two features: the
total number of reviews received for all app versions and the percentage of reviews
received per star rating. Finally feature for the review, we selected the length, i.e.
the characters count.
5.2 Data Preprocessing
We preprocessed the data in three steps. We began by performing data cleaning,
i.e., filling null values instead of removing affected columns. Of the selected features
only a single column includes null values, see Table 7. The review frequency is in
1,734 cases undefined because only a single review was provided by the reviewer.
In this case, we set the frequency to lifetime of the app store, which is 9 years.
Then, we normalized the dataset so that individual samples to have unit norm.
We used the normalize() method with standard parameters of the preprocessing
module provided by scikit-learn (Pedregosa et al., 2011).
Last, we standardized the dataset so that the individual features are standard
normally distributed, i.e., gaussian with zero mean and unit variance. This is a
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Table 8 Classifiers’ scores to detect fake reviews.
Classifier Accuracy Precision Recall F1 AUC/ROC
RandomForestClassifier 0.970 0.973 0.967 0.970 0.989
DecisionTreeClassifier 0.953 0.949 0.957 0.953 0.953
MLPClassifier 0.919 0.921 0.916 0.918 0.969
SVC(kernel=’rbf’) 0.901 0.879 0.930 0.904 0.959
SVC(kernel=’linear’) 0.899 0.878 0.926 0.902 0.960
LinearSVC 0.895 0.861 0.941 0.900 0.964
GaussianNB 0.765 0.731 0.889 0.755 0.955
common requirement for many classification algorithms, such as the radial ba-
sis function (RBF) kernel of support vector machines. If not standardizing the
data, features with a much higher variance compared to others might dominate
the objective function. As a result, the classification algorithm is unable to learn
from other features (SciKit, 2018). We used the scale() method with standard
parameters of the preprocessing module.
5.3 Classification with Balanced Data
We compare seven supervised machine learning approaches to classify reviews as
fake or not. We use the implementations provided by the scikit-learn (Pedregosa
et al., 2011) library. Supervised approaches need to be trained using a labeled
truthset before they can be applied. This truthset is split into a training and
testing set. The training set is used by the algorithms to build a model on which
unseen instances are classified. In the test phase, the classifier performs a binary
classification and decides whether reviews within the test set are fake or not.
To get more reliable measures of the model quality, we apply cross validation on
our truthset. This is performed in several folds, i.e., splits of the data, called k-fold
cross validation. In this paper we perform 10 folds. Per fold, a randomly selected
amount of 1/k of the overall data is held out of the training as a test set for the
evaluation. The final performance is the average of the scores computed in all folds.
Using cross validation, we also avoid bias which would otherwise be introduced by
using only a random train/test split. In addition, although our truthset is balanced,
we apply stratification. Stratification ensures that each split contains a balanced
amount of fake and official reviews. We repeat the cross validation 30 times per
classification algorithm with different seeds. We use the RepeatedStratifiedKFold
method of the model selection module.
The seven classification algorithms we compare are the following: Naive Bayes
(GaussianNB) is a popular algorithm for binary classification (Bird et al., 2009),
which is based on the Bayes theorem with strong independence assumptions be-
tween features. Compared to other classifiers it does not require a large training
set. Random Forest (RF) (Ho, 1995) is an ensemble learning method for classifica-
tion and other tasks. It can build multiple trees in randomly selected subspaces of
the feature space. Decision Tree (DT) (Torgo, 2010) assumes that all features have
finite discrete domains and that there is a single target feature representing the
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classification (i.e., the tree leaves). Support Vector Machine (SVM) (Cortes and
Vapnik, 1995) represents the training data as points in space. It creates support
vectors for gaps between classes in the space. The test data is classified based on
which side of the gap its instances fall. The Gaussian radial basis function (rbf)
is used for non-linear classification by applying the kernel trick (Aizerman et al.,
1964). Linear support vector classification (LinearSVC) penalizes the intercept,
in comparison to SVM. Multilayer perceptron (MLP) is an artificial neural net-
work which consists of at least three layers of nodes. MLP utilizes the supervised
learning technique backpropagation for training.
Table 8 shows the results of the seven classification algorithms, each with de-
fault configuration. The results include accuracy, precision, recall, F1-score, and
area under the ROC curve (AUC) value. Among all, the random forest algorithm
achieved the best scores.
5.4 Optimization
We optimize the classifiers by performing feature selection and hyperparameter
tuning. We optimize for precision only. In comparison to fake reviews, for reg-
ular reviews we were unable to create a gold-standard dataset. To create a gold-
standard dataset for regular non-fake reviews, all fake reviews must be identified
and removed from the official reviews dataset. This is practically in-feasible as
there is currently no measure to ensure that a review is not fake.
Hence we do not know all fake reviews, we can only report on how many of
the known fake reviews are classified as fake (precision) and not on how many of
all existing fake reviews were classified as fake (recall). Resultant measures, such
as the F1-score, are reported for completeness.
To select features, we apply recursive feature elimination with cross valida-
tion. After the classification algorithm assigned a weight to each feature, these
are eliminated recursively by considering smaller sets. Per iteration, the least im-
portant feature is removed to determine their optimal number. We use the RFECV
method from the feature selection module. The cross validation is performed
as described in the previous phase.
We received the best result with the random forest algorithm using all features.
Nearly similar accuracies are already possible with less features, e.g., the precision
with three features is 0.969, compared to 0.973 using all features, see Figure 14.
The three selected features are the 1) total number of reviews the app received and
2) the user provided, as well as the 3) frequency in which the user provides reviews.
To tune the hyperparameters, we apply the grid search method GridSearchCV
from the model selection module. This method performs a cross validated, ex-
haustive search over a predefined grid of parameters for a classification algorithm.
After finding the optimal combination of parameters within the grid, this is further
manually tuned by adding more values around the currently best.
We achieved the best result using the random forest algorithm with the pa-
rameters {’criterion’: ’gini’, ’max depth’: 30, ’max features’: ’sqrt’, ’n estimators’:
300}. The parameter criterion measures the quality of a split. We used Gini im-
purity, which is intended for continuous attributes and faster to compute com-
pared to Entropy. It is recommended to minimize the number of misclassifications.
max depth defines the depth of the tree. max features sets the number of features
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Fig. 15 Relative importance of extracted features to detect fake reviews.
to consider when looking for the best split. n estimators defines the number of
trees in the forest.
Although performing hyperparameter tuning, the classifier’s precision equal
the results using the default configuration. Only measures we do not consider, the
recall and F1-score, were slightly improved resulting in 98% each.
5.5 Feature Importance
Last, we analyzed the relative importance of the extracted features with respect
to the predictability of whether a given review is fake or not, called feature im-
portance. The feature importance is calculated on how often a feature is used in
the split points of a tree. More frequently used features are more important.
Figure 15 shows that the three most important feature are the total number of
reviews an app received (30%), the total number of reviews a user provided (24%),
and the frequency with that a user provides reviews (13%).
We assume the total number of reviews received by an app is the most impor-
tant feature as apps with a specific amount of reviews, e.g., 2-9 reviews (cf. Section
4.1), are most often targeted by fake reviews. The total number of reviews a user
provided as well as review frequency have a high importance as fake reviewers
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Table 9 Confusion matrix of a two-class problem
Predicted as fake review Predicted as regular review
Actual fake review True positive (TP) False negative (FN)
Actual regular review False positive (FP) True negative (TN)
provide much more reviews than regular reviewers, with a higher frequency. The
percentage of 1- and 2-star ratings an app received are important, as the differ-
ence between those star ratings provided are the highest when comparing apps
with fake reviews and regular apps (cf. Figure 9).
5.6 Classification with Imbalanced Data
In practice, fake and regular reviews are imbalanced. For app stores no reliable
estimate on the distribution exists. Other domains, such as social media, mark
10% to 15% of their reviews as fake (Sussin and Thompson, 2018). The travel
portal Yelp filters about 15% of their reviews as suspicious (Luca and Zervas,
2016; Mukherjee et al., 2013a). This class imbalance can additionally be affected
by numerous factors, such as the selected apps or time period. Free apps, for
example, receive more fake reviews than paid apps (cf. Section 4.1). This reveals
a skewed distribution of fake and regular reviews in app stores.
Research found that highly imbalanced data often results into poor perform-
ing classification models (Drummond et al., 2003; Chawla et al., 2004; Saito et al.,
2007). To have a more realistic setting of how our classifier can perform in prac-
tice, we conduct an in-the-wild experiment by varying the skewness of our dataset.
We decided to vary the skewness on a logarithmic scale to depict the classifica-
tion scores on finer granularities towards extremely imbalanced datasets with fake
reviews as the minority class. We keep a fixed amount of 8,000 fake reviews and
create 27 datasets including 102 − 10 (90%) to 10−1 (0.1%) fake reviews. For a
skew of 90% we used 889 regular reviews. With every change of the skewness
we added additional regular reviews. All of the about 8 million used regular re-
views were randomly selected at once from the official reviews dataset, so that the
classification results are comparable.
Figure 16 shows an overview of the results of the seven supervised machine
learning approaches studied in this work. Per classification algorithm and skewed
dataset, we report on the precision, recall, F1-score, and AUC value.
Since identifying fake reviews is a two-class problem, the performance metrics
can be derived from the confusion matrix that is generated with every classifica-
tion, see Table 9. We explain the reported performance metrics in the following:
Precision ( TPTP+FP ) measures the exactness, i.e., the number of correctly classified
fake reviews to the overall number of reviews classified as fake. Recall ( TPTP+FN )
measures the completeness, i.e., the number of correctly classified fake reviews to
the overall number of fake reviews. The F1-score ( recall∗precisionprecision+recall ) is the harmonic
mean between precision and recall. As improving precision and recall can be con-
flicting, it shows the trade-off between both. The AUC value measures the area
under the ROC curve. It varies within the interval [0, 1]. The ROC curve itself de-
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Fig. 16 Classification scores of machine learning algorithms on imbalanced datasets, including
90% to 0.1% fake reviews, plotted on a logarithmic scale.
picts all possible trade-offs between TP rate, i.e., recall, and FP rate ( FPTN+FP ). A
better classifier produces an ROC curve closer to the top-left corner and therefore
a higher AUC value (Wang et al., 2018).
As we are focusing on skewed datasets within our in-the-wild experiment, we
need to select performance metrics that are insensitive to class imbalance. This
applies for all measures that use values from only one row of the confusion ma-
trix (Wang et al., 2018). Precision and F1-score are sensitive to class imbalance and
biased towards the majority class. Therefore, these metrics are inappropriate for
our evaluation. Recall and AUC/ROC value are insensitive to class distribution,
we use both measures to compare the performance of the classification algorithms
within our in-the-wild experiment.
In the further evaluation, we include all classifiers that achieve a recall and
AUC value higher than 0.5 for datasets including 90% to 1% fake reviews. This
applies for the random forest (RF), decision tree (DT), and MLP algorithm. The
remaining algorithms are excluded from the evaluation. The recall of the gaussian
naive bayes (GaussianNB) algorithm decreases to nearly 0 for datasets with fake
reviews as the majority class. Also, its precision is extremely low for datasets
including less than 10% fake reviews. Similarly, the recall of the SVC algorithms
decrease to nearly 0 for datasets with less than 10% fake reviews. In addition, the
SVC(kernel=’linear’) implementation of sklearn return errors for skews below 5%,
so do the remaining two SVC algorithms for skews of 0.1%.
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Fig. 17 Classification scores of appropriate machine learning algorithms for datasets with
class imbalance, i.e., including 90% to 0.1% fake reviews, plotted on a logarithmic scale.
5.6.1 Classification Results with Imbalanced Data
Figure 17 shows the performance measures of all three classification algorithms
that remain within our evaluation. We chose to depict each measure as a single
plot to more easily compare the algorithms. We report the precision and F1-
score for reasons of completeness, although these are inappropriate measures for
imbalanced data. Within the graphs, we highlight in gray the interval in which fake
reviews typically occur in other domains. Further, we mark where the classes are
equally distributed, i.e., there exist 50% fake reviews. At this point the algorithms
perform well with all measures above 0.9 (cf. Table 10).
Unfortunately, in practice there can exist imbalances towards fake or regular
reviews being the majority class. From our results and research in other domains
it is more likely that the bias is towards regular reviews. For this reason we choose
more detailed results towards fake reviews being the minority class.
However, when fake reviews become the majority class (towards the right of
the 50% mark) the recall improves for all algorithms, by up to 6.4% for the MLP
algorithm. The best result is achieved by the RF algorithm with 0.986 recall. The
AUC value decreases in all cases, for the RF and MLP algorithms the value slightly
decreases by up to 0.5%. The value of the DT algorithm decreases more stronly by
5.5%. The best AUC value is achieved by the random forest algorithm with 0.984.
When fake reviews become the minority class most performance measures de-
crease. With an amount of 10% fake reviews (101), as reported to be typical for
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Table 10 Classification scores on imbalanced datasets with skews of 90% to 0.1% fake reviews
(DT: DecisionTreeClassifier, MLP: MLPClassifier, RF: RandomForestClassifier).
Skew Recall AUC/ROC Precision F1-score
DT MLP RF DT MLP RF DT MLP RF DT MLP RF
90.0 0.982 0.978 0.986 0.897 0.968 0.984 0.979 0.970 0.987 0.981 0.974 0.986
80.0 0.972 0.963 0.980 0.923 0.970 0.987 0.968 0.958 0.984 0.970 0.960 0.982
70.0 0.966 0.943 0.976 0.941 0.973 0.987 0.964 0.954 0.980 0.965 0.949 0.978
60.0 0.964 0.940 0.970 0.946 0.974 0.988 0.952 0.940 0.976 0.958 0.940 0.973
50.0 0.953 0.920 0.962 0.950 0.972 0.989 0.947 0.925 0.974 0.950 0.922 0.968
40.0 0.945 0.902 0.956 0.953 0.972 0.989 0.941 0.914 0.972 0.943 0.908 0.964
30.0 0.942 0.872 0.947 0.956 0.973 0.988 0.932 0.903 0.963 0.937 0.887 0.955
20.0 0.924 0.842 0.937 0.950 0.974 0.988 0.903 0.885 0.950 0.914 0.863 0.944
10.0 0.896 0.758 0.912 0.941 0.977 0.986 0.872 0.859 0.933 0.884 0.802 0.922
9.0 0.894 0.824 0.907 0.940 0.978 0.986 0.865 0.826 0.925 0.879 0.824 0.916
8.0 0.885 0.809 0.896 0.936 0.979 0.986 0.859 0.832 0.925 0.872 0.819 0.910
7.0 0.884 0.785 0.892 0.936 0.979 0.984 0.855 0.830 0.920 0.869 0.807 0.906
6.0 0.857 0.804 0.882 0.924 0.978 0.983 0.848 0.790 0.915 0.853 0.797 0.898
5.0 0.860 0.694 0.876 0.925 0.979 0.984 0.826 0.820 0.904 0.843 0.752 0.890
4.0 0.857 0.714 0.869 0.925 0.979 0.982 0.816 0.776 0.902 0.836 0.744 0.885
3.0 0.830 0.681 0.846 0.912 0.980 0.980 0.789 0.741 0.898 0.809 0.710 0.871
2.0 0.806 0.567 0.814 0.901 0.978 0.978 0.764 0.690 0.900 0.784 0.622 0.855
1.0 0.775 0.395 0.756 0.886 0.978 0.971 0.723 0.589 0.900 0.748 0.473 0.822
0.9 0.776 0.255 0.755 0.886 0.976 0.973 0.730 0.606 0.895 0.752 0.359 0.819
0.8 0.764 0.300 0.735 0.881 0.978 0.969 0.714 0.555 0.901 0.738 0.380 0.810
0.7 0.765 0.252 0.731 0.881 0.977 0.968 0.714 0.559 0.906 0.738 0.334 0.809
0.6 0.756 0.166 0.710 0.877 0.976 0.967 0.697 0.536 0.897 0.725 0.253 0.793
0.5 0.747 0.065 0.703 0.873 0.977 0.966 0.690 0.600 0.916 0.717 0.117 0.796
0.4 0.735 0.021 0.661 0.867 0.975 0.963 0.675 0.496 0.912 0.704 0.038 0.766
0.3 0.712 0.001 0.634 0.855 0.976 0.962 0.656 0.396 0.930 0.683 0.002 0.754
0.2 0.692 0.001 0.608 0.846 0.975 0.952 0.638 0.292 0.931 0.664 0.001 0.736
0.1 0.680 0.000 0.560 0.840 0.973 0.945 0.712 0.100 0.962 0.696 0.000 0.707
other domains (Sussin and Thompson, 2018; Luca and Zervas, 2016; Mukherjee
et al., 2013a), the recall of the RF and DT algorithm are nearly identical (RF:
0.912, DT: 0.896). Compared to the result of the balanced dataset, the recall de-
creased by 5.3% for the RF algorithm and by 5.9% for the DT algorithm. The
recall of the MLP algorithm is significantly less with 0.758 (-17.6%). The AUC
value is the highest for the RF algorithm (0.986, +0.3%), followed by the MLP
(0.977, +0.6%) and DLT (0.941, -0.9%) algorithms.
For 1% fake reviews (100), the recall of the RF and DT algorithms is still
nearly identical (RF: 0.756, -21.4%; DT: 0.775, -18.7%), followed by the MLP algo-
rithm (0.395, -57.1%). The AUC value is the highest for the MLP algorithm (0.978,
+0.7%), followed by the RF (0.971, -1.8%) and DT (0.886, -6.7%) algorithms.
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For an amount of 0.1% fake reviews (10−1) the recall is the highest for the
DT algorithm (0.680, -28.6%), followed by the RF algorithm (0.560, -41.8%). The
recall of the MLP algorithm dropped to 0 at about 0.3% fake reviews and below
within the dataset. The AUC value is the highest for the MLP algorithm (0.973,
+0.2%), followed by the RF algorithm (0.945, -4.4%). Last, the AUC value of the
DT algorithm significantly decreased to 0.840 (-11.4%).
Comparing all three algorithms using their recall and AUC/ROC value, the
random forest algorithm performs best for imbalanced datasets. Al-
though, the decision tree algorithm achieves a better recall when the dataset is
extremely skewed (less than 1% fake reviews), its AUC/ROC value is significantly
lower for all datasets. Similar, the MLP algorithm achieves better AUC/ROC
values for datasets with less than 1% fake reviews. However, the recall of the
MLP algorithm drops to 0 for extremely skewed datasets. With skews common for
other domains, the random forest algorithm performs best with a recall of 0.912
and AUC/ROC value of 0.986.
6 Discussion
We discuss implications of fake reviews on software engineering, and from the
perspective of app users and store operators. Then, we discuss the results’ validity.
6.1 Implications
In modern app stores, developers are for the first time able to publicly retrieve
customers’ and users’ opinions about their software and to compare its popularity
in form of rank or number of downloads. Although app reviews provide a rich
source of information, they may not be fully reliable, as customers may leave
reviews that do not reflect their true impressions (Finkelstein et al., 2017). Our
work shed light on one of these cases: fake reviews.
Generally, fake reviews, i.e., paid, incentivized reviews (which can provided
either directly or via fake review providers) are prohibited by official app store re-
viewing policies. The main reason is to preserve the integrity of app stores (Ap-
ple, 2017; Google, 2018). Users that do not trust app stores and their reviews will
most likely refrain from providing app reviews themselves. This would harm one of
the most important advantages of app stores: collecting real, spontaneous feedback
on software in a channel used by both developers and users.
We applied our fake review classifier to the full official Apple App Store dataset.
As a results, 22,207,782 (35,5%) of all 62,617,037 reviews were classified as fake.
This number seems very high at first and can only be used as a first indication. Fur-
ther studies need to be carried out to give a precise approximation of the amount
of fake reviews in official app stores. Still, multiple indices indicates a non-trivial
amount of fake reviews in app stores. We identified about 60,000 reviews from
only a single provider. Overall, we identified 43 providers while much more might
exists or have existed before. If every provider would provide the same number of
reviews, the amount would sum up to 2.58 million fake reviews. We hypothesize
that the majority of fake reviews is written by persons, who get directly asked by
developers. Although not generalizable, we repeatedly observed this phenomena
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in our professional app development settings. When apps are developed privately,
friends were asked to provide fake reviews. When programmed in a commercial
environment, either employees of the developing company or of the ordering com-
pany (cf. Bell (9to5Mac, 2017)) are asked to provide fake reviews. Given that 1.4
million apps exists within the dataset the number of fake reviews does no longer
seem unattainably high. Such amount of fake reviews are also presumed in other
domains. Streitfeld (Times, 2017) report that every fifth review submitted to Yelp
is detected as dubious by internal filters.
App users might, by using positive or negative fake reviews, get mislead to
either downloading an app or not. As shown by Ott et al. (Ott et al., 2011) fake
reviews sound authentic and are hard to detect by humans. In an experiment,
humans at most scored an accuracy of 61% identifying fake reviews, even as the
word distribution of the used fake reviews differed from regular reviews. We think
that this also applies for apps. Users and developers might not be able to identify
fake reviews only based on their text.
Measures and tools should enable users (and developers) to identify fake re-
views and affected apps. Such tools already exist for products sold on Amazon,
e.g., Fakespot (Fakespot, 2017). Users enter the name of a product to determine
if its reviews are trustworthy. Fakespot also takes a step towards analyzing fake
reviews in the app store. The features used to classify reviews as fake also related
to the review context, such as if a large number of positive reviews is provided
within a short period of time. However, the selected criteria to classify reviews
as fake are not completely transparent nor empirically validated. Also, we assume
that no gold-standard dataset has been used for fake reviews. For the Instagram
app the site, e.g., classifies 50% (about 600,000) of the reviews as fake, which raises
accuracy concerns for this approach.
The research area App Store Analysis covers work to mine apps and their
reviews and extract relevant information for software and requirements practi-
tioners, e.g., to get inspirations about what should be developed and to guide the
development process (Harman et al., 2012; Pagano and Bru¨gge, 2013; Pagano and
Maalej, 2013; Villarroel et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2014; Guzman and Maalej, 2014;
Iacob and Harrison, 2013; Khalid, 2013; Carreno and Winbladh, 2013). Martin et
al. provide a comprehensive literature review of this area (Martin et al., 2016).
The majority of papers identified in their study (127 of 187 papers, 68%) analyze
non-technical information, such as app reviews.
Review Analysis itself is one of the largest sub-fields of app store analysis, which
receives a significant and increasing number of publications each year. Work in this
sub-field started by analyzing the content of app reviews (2012 – 2013), afterwards
focusing on adding additional features such as sentiments (2013 – 2014). Then,
app reviews were summarized to extract app requirements. Although, information
extracted from app reviews is getting increasingly integrated into the requirements
engineering processes (Palomba et al., 2015; Maalej et al., 2016b), none of the
papers discusses the impact of fake reviews. In the following, we discuss
the potential impact of fake reviews on software engineering along with the main
review analysis topics according to Martin et al. (Martin et al., 2016).
Fake reviews, similar to official reviews, include requirements-related in-
formation, such as feature requests. Oh et al. automatically categorize app
reviews into bug reports and non-/functional requests to produce a digest for devel-
opers including the most informative reviews (Oh et al., 2013). Additional work
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Fig. 18 Reviews within truthset classified as bug report and/or feature request.
focuses on extracting requirements-related information from app reviews (Iacob
et al., 2014, 2013; Panichella et al., 2015). Iacob and Harrison found that 23.3%
of the app reviews include feature requests (Iacob and Harrison, 2013). We ap-
plied the classifier of Maalej et al. (Maalej et al., 2016a) to extract bug reports
and feature request from the 8,000 official and 8,000 fake reviews included in our
truthset (see Figure 18). While fake and regular reviews are imbalanced within the
overall app store dataset, when applying review analysis approaches on a subset
of reviews the distribution is unknown. For this reason, we did not set a specific
distribution of fake and regular reviews. Within the official reviews, we identified
1,297 bug reports and 921 feature requests, while we found that the fake reviews
contain 362 bug reports and 521 feature requests. We include an example feature
request within the fake review dataset below.
Nice UI ? ? ??
Very clean and beautiful UI. I like the goal setting and the reminders. I
would like to see some animation when scrolling the weekly progress bars.
We assume that most fake reviewers did not use the reviewed app before and
are unfamiliar with it. In addition, review policies ask fake reviewers to explicitly
talk about features rather than providing praise only. For this reasons, it is unclear
if those feature requests are really relevant or only thought up to make the review
sound more authentic. Fake reviews might thus impact the results of existing
classifiers. When not removing or at least flagging fake reviews with information
relevant for developers, wrong assumptions for the future decisions might be drawn.
Researchers showed that nearly half of the feature requests included in
app reviews are implemented. Hoon et al. highlight that user expectations
are changing rapidly, as observable through app reviews. Developers must keep up
with the demand to stay competitive (Hoon et al., 2013). Palomba et al. studied
the reviews of 100 open-source apps. By linking reviews to code changes the au-
thors showed that 49% of the changes requested were implemented in app updates
(Palomba et al., 2015). These results show that a significant amount of changes
proposed by users are integrated into software. Some of these changes might be
inspired and prioritized based on fake reviews.
Recent approaches summarize and extract requirements-related information
from app reviews of related or competing apps. Fu et al. present WisCom
to analyze app reviews per app/market level, e.g., to get an overview of competing
apps (Fu et al., 2013). Gao et al. present AR-Tracker to summarize app reviews
to real issues and prioritize them by their frequency and importance (Gao et al.,
2015). Nayebi et al. mine app reviews and tweets of similar apps within a specific
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domain (Nayebi and Ruhe, 2017; Nayebi et al., 2017). These approaches monitor
and extract information from app reviews of related or competing apps. While de-
velopers will probably know when their apps receive fake reviews, i.e., when they
bought those instead of being affected by negative fake reviews bought by competi-
tors, developers cannot be fully sure if competing apps receive fake reviews. Wrong
conclusions can also be drawn from fake reviews including the honest opinion of
reviewers. Fake reviewers can just copy and modify a regular review they honestly
agree with and resubmit those on review exchange portals. This way the frequency
(and hence the priority) of, e.g., a feature request, might be fake (i.e. incentivized)
and thus biased. Table 5 highlights that only three review exchange portals forbid
fake reviewers to copy and modify existing reviews. Using those reviews as input
for summarization approaches, “wrong” features could emerge as a result.
App store operators try to prevent fake reviews by providing review policies.
The Apple App Store policy (Apple, 2017) states that apps will be removed and
that the developers may be expelled from the app store’s developer program ”if we
find that you have attempted to manipulate reviews, inflate your chart rankings with
paid, incentivized, filtered, or fake feedback”. This is the case when app developers
buy fake reviews. However, the concrete actions taken to identify fake reviews
are non-transparent. We also noticed that larger, popular apps try to prevent
negative feedback from being submitted to the app store. These apps ask users
for submitting feedback within the app in form of star ratings. The rating is not
directly forwarded to the app store. In case of a one star rating, a mail form
appears asking the user to submit the review directly to the app developer instead
of forwarding it to the app store, where the review is publicly visible. Such actions
might also manipulate the app ratings and reviews as well.
We think that researchers should carefully sample apps and perform data clean-
ings before studying and mining app reviews. For example, apps with an unusual
distribution of ratings might be affected by fake reviews. Similar, reviews of users
with an amount or frequency above average might have to be removed or consid-
ered separately during data cleaning. Otherwise, wrong assumptions for the future
development of an app could be drawn.
Collecting and analyzing context and usage information can help sub-
stantiate decisions and check the quality of reviews (Maalej et al., 2016b). App
developers can, e.g., utilize the number of users or the average time users spend
with a specific feature to decide which parts of their apps to improve and which
suggestions should be taken into consideration in the next release. App store op-
erators can take measures, such as the number of times a user opened an app
or the daily app usage time to decide the trustworthiness and weight of reviews
within an app’s overall rating. Instead of limiting the amount of users who can
participate in the reviewing process, one might think about to weight or consider
incentivized reviews differently and in a transparent manner. Since the overall app
store ecosystem is designed that more positive reviews lead to more downloads and
thus increase the app’s success (Harman et al., 2012), developers will likely con-
tinue to ask “friends” to rate their apps. Even if incentivized and not independent,
such reviews can also include useful information. Instead of excluding the reviews
and their reviewers, a possible alternative might be to highlight these review with
badges (e.g., friend, expert, or crowd testers).
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6.2 Results Validity
The results of our study might have limitations and should be considered within
the study context.
The process of extracting actual fake reviews was challenging. However, we did
not try to generate fake reviews using a crowdsourced approach, as we wanted to
only rely on fake reviews that have been published to and still remain unidentified
within the app store by its users and operators. For this reason, we decided only
using a subset of our about 60,000 collected fake reviews.
Nearly all reviews were extracted from a single provider. This provider is a
review exchange portal (see Table 1, REP3). On these portals reviewers could
submit their honest opinion. However, we consider the collected reviews as
fake for the following reasons:
First, app store operators strongly require that app reviews must be 1) written
by real users of the app and 2) cannot be incentivized. Both conditions are not given
in review exchange portals. For this reason, these reviews are fake according to the
definition and agreement or app store providers. Even if reviewers are allowed to
submit their honest opinion according to the review policy of this exchange portal,
rewarded, incentivized, or non-spontaneous reviews are prohibited by the official
Google and Apple App Store Review Guidelines (Apple, 2017; Google, 2018).
Second, review exchange portals provide predefined ratings and review mes-
sages. These ratings do not necessarily correspond to the opinion of the reviewers.
The providers’ review policies ensure that reviewers that post their honest opinion
are not being rewarded and are excluded from reviewing portals. The review policy
of REP3 does not include a general rating, e.g., 3-stars or above (cf. Table 5). The
provider uses individual policies per app (cf. Figure 4). We could not extract his-
torical data to say if all individual policies included a predefined rating. However,
for active review requests at the time of data collection, predefined ratings were
included in all cases.
Third, paid review providers and review exchange portals share reviewers. As
identified, paid review providers cross-post their review requests on review ex-
change portals (cf. Figure 5). This also applies for REP3. Paid review providers
would not cross-post their review requests on these portals, if the app ratings
would not change as desired by app developers.
Fourth, per app we compared the collected fake reviews to each other. We
searched for apps that received fake reviews with a rating of 1-2 stars as well
as fake reviews with a rating of 4-5 stars. These reviews are most likely written
by reviewers that posted their honest opinion about an app, either positive or
negative. This applies for only 32 of the 1,890 (1.69%) collected apps. For these
apps, 41 1-star and 2-star reviews out of 8,607 reviews (0.48%) were provided.
Another limitation is that although we filtered fake reviews for reviews in
English language only and targeted the US storefront of the Apple App Store,
reviews in English language could have been submitted to other storefronts. This
could be a possible reason why we were only able to identify 8,607 of the initially
collected 60,431 fake reviews within the app store, i.e., the official reviews dataset.
In this case, the moderation of reviews by app store operators is less strict than
observed.
Further, review exchange portals are also used by app developers, since the
reward of providing a fake review is a credit which can be redeemed into another
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fake review for an app specified. As a result, the amount of requirements-related
information included in fake reviews could be influenced since some users of the
portals might be app developers.
For in-app purchases, we were unable to receive the offers programatically.
Therefore, we could not compare the manually collected in-app purchases for apps
affected by fake reviews against other app store in-app purchases. Also, we could
not identify statistics which we could have used alternatively, or statistics on the
monetization through ads.
However, we decided to focus on the Apple App Store because of our prior
experience with the technology and because this app store does not impose major
API limitations to retrieve its data, e.g., compared to Google Play with limits the
number of accessible reviews to 2,000 per app and uses captchas. To have reliable
results for the Apple App Store itself we crawled the largest dataset of about 62
million app reviews which has been analyzed so far to our knowledge. Thereby, we
also avoid the App Sampling Problem for app store mining, described by Martin
et al. (Martin et al., 2015).
The questionnaire we conducted with the paid review providers was hidden
as a request for buying app reviews. We cannot assure that the responses only
contain true statements. Therefore, we contacted several providers again after a
few weeks using a different identity and communication channel, such as Skype.
For providers we contacted again, their responses did not change.
When manually labelling data, such as when finding agreements for poten-
tial matches between reviews within the fake reviews dataset and official reviews
dataset, we used two human annotators which independently solved the task. In
case of mismatches (3%), we resolved the conflicts using a third human annotator.
However, single reviews could have been mismatched.
For statistical tests, in addition to reporting the p value we also calculated
the effect size. For t-tests we calculated the effect size using Cohen’s d, that is
the difference between means divided by the pooled standard deviation (Cohen,
1988). For Wilcoxon tests we calculated the r value, dividing the z distribution by
the square root of the number of samples (Fritz et al., 2012). We report the effect
size considering the following values, for Cohen’s d (0.2 = small, 0.5 = medium,
0.8 = large) and for the correlation coefficient r (0.10 = small, 0.30 = medium,
0.50 = large). In two cases, although a statistical difference was observed the effect
size revealed that the magnitude between differences is near zero. For these, the
tests need to be repeated with additional samples (i.e., fake reviews) to show a
statistical difference.
We want to stress that our classifier is only a first attempt to automatically
identify fake reviews and not the main contribution of our paper. We wanted to
verify if the features identified in our study are relevant for identifying fake reviews.
The machine learning model could be overfitted. This may be due to the small
amount of fake reviews. More fake reviews need to be collected to improve the
results. We tried to minimize overfitting by using k-fold cross validation. To mini-
mize the impact of randomly chosen data, we used another 8,000 randomly selected
official reviews and were able to reproduce our results reported in the paper.
Moreover, we cannot ensure that all official reviews are non-fake reviews. As
stated before, to provide a gold-standard dataset for regular reviews as well, all
fake reviews must be known and removed which is the problem we are trying to
solve in this paper. For this reason, we optimized the classifier for precision only.
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We leave the development of an advanced classifier for future research. Ad-
ditional features, e.g., the emotion of users (Calefato et al., 2017; Martens and
Johann, 2017), have to be analyzed to strengthen the results. For that we publicly
share our gold-standard fake reviews dataset within our replication package.
7 Related Work
User reviews are a valuable resource for decision making – both to other users
and developers. To our best knowledge no published studies on fake reviews for
software products exist.
A similar phenomena to fake reviews for software products, called web spam-
ming, has been studied earlier when web pages began to compete for the rank
within search engines’ results. This is comparable to apps competing within app
stores today. Web spamming is defined as the act of misleading search engines
to rank pages higher than they deserve. Website operators edit their pages, e.g.,
by repeatedly adding specific terms that improve their ranking in search results
(Gyongyi and Garcia-Molina, 2005). Based on this a definition for user-generated
content emerged, called opinion spam. The authors divide opinion spam into three
categories, of which the first category are untruthful opinions. These mislead read-
ers and opinion mining systems by giving undeserved/unjust either positive reviews
to promote or negative reviews to damage the reputation of a target object. Un-
truthful opinions are also commonly known as fake reviews (Jindal and Liu, 2008).
This definition has been refined several times, e.g., by adding that fake reviews
are written by persons as if they were real customers (Ott et al., 2011).
Recent research in other areas studied fake reviews, e.g., for products sold on
Amazon, hotels rated on TripAdvisor, and businesses rated on Yelp. Jindal and
Liu (Jindal and Liu, 2008) first analyzed opinion spam. The authors analyze 5.8
million reviews and 2.14 million reviewers from Amazon to detect spam activities
and present techniques to detect those. Due to the difficulty to create a fake
reviews dataset, the authors used duplicate and near-duplicate reviews written by
the same reviewers on different products. In our work we were able to extract data
from fake review providers to achieve more reliable results.
Ott et al. (Ott et al., 2011) state that an increasing amount of user reviews
is provided. Due to their value, platforms containing user reviews are becoming
targets of opinion spam for potential monetary gain – our work confirms this for
app stores and provides further insight on the fake review offers and policies. The
authors focus on analyzing deceptive fake reviews, which are reviews that have
been written to sound authentic, instead of disruptive fake reviews. The authors
highlighted that there are few sources for deceptive fake reviews. To overcome
the issue they hired 400 humans using a crowd-sourcing platform to write fake
hotel reviews. Their classifier integrates work from psychology and computational
linguistics. It has an accuracy of nearly 90% on the crowdsourced dataset. The
authors showed that classifiers are better in recognizing deceptive fake reviews
compared to humans which scored an accuracy of 61% at most.
Feng et al. (Feng et al., 2012) analyzed fake reviews on TripAdvisor and Ama-
zon. They identified fake reviews based on the hypothesis that for a given domain
a representative distribution of review rating scores exist which is distorted by
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fake reviews. The authors used an unsupervised learning approach to create a re-
view dataset that is labeled automatically based on rating distributions. Using a
statistical classifier trained on that dataset the authors were able to detect fake
reviews with an accuracy of 72%.
Mukherjee et al. (Mukherjee et al., 2013b), compared to existing studies, used
real fake reviews instead of pseudo-fake reviews, e.g., generated using crowdsourc-
ing platforms. Their dataset consists of fake reviews published on Yelp, filtered
and marked by the platform itself. The authors used the supervised approach of
Ott et al. (Ott et al., 2011) on their dataset an achieved a significantly lower accu-
racy of 67.8%, compared to 89.6%. The authors found that the word distribution
of pseudo-fake reviews is different to the word distribution of real reviews. How-
ever, this does not apply for fake reviews within their dataset. Instead of using
linguistic features, the authors suggest to use behavioral features. These include
numeric values, such as the maximum number of reviews of a reviewer per day,
or the review length. We followed this approach when designing our classifier and
achieved encouraging results of up to 97% precision.
Fake reviews have also been frequently discussed within the media. Streitfeld
(Times, 2017) reported that every fifth review submitted to Yelp is detected as
dubious by its internal filters. Instead of removing dubious reviews, these are
moved to the second page where they are read by less users. As fake reviews further
increase, Yelp began a ’sting’ campaign to publicly expose businesses buying fake
reviews.
8 Conclusion
App reviews can be a valuable, unique source of information for software engineer-
ing teams reflecting the opinions and needs of actual users. Also potential users
read through the reviews before deciding to download an app, similar to buying
other products on the Internet. Our work shows that part of app reviews in app
stores are fake – that is, they are incentivized and might not reflect spontaneous,
unbiased opinions.
We analyzed the market of fake review providers and their fake reviewing
strategies and found that developers buy reviews to relatively expensive prices of
a few dollars or deal with reviews in exchange portals. Fake reviews are written
to look authentic and are hard to recognize by humans. We identified differences
between fake and official reviews. We found that properties of the corresponding
app and reviewer are most useful to determine if a review is fake. Based on the
identified differences, we developed, trained, fine-tuned, and compared multiple
supervised machine learning approaches. We found that the Random Forest clas-
sifier identifies fake reviews, given a proportional distribution of fake and regular
reviews as reported in other domains, with a recall of 91% and AUC/ROC value
of 98%. We publicly share our gold-standard fake reviews dataset to enable the
development of more accurate classifiers to identify fake reviews. Our work helps
app store mining researchers to sample apps and perform data cleaning to achieve
more reliable results. Further, tools for app users and store operators can be built
based on our findings to detect if app reviews are trustworthy and to take further
actions against fake reviewers.
40 Daniel Martens, Walid Maalej
Acknowledgment
This research was partially supported by the European Union Horizon 2020 project
OpenReq under grant agreement no. 732463.
References
9to5Mac (2017) Bell faces $1.25M fine for posting fake reviews of its app in the App
Store. https://9to5mac.com/2015/10/14/bell-fake-app-store-reviews/
Aizerman MA, Braverman EA, Rozonoer L (1964) Theoretical foundations of the
potential function method in pattern recognition learning. In: Automation and
Remote Control,, no. 25 in Automation and Remote Control,, pp 821–837
AppAnnie (2017) App Annie. https://www.appannie.com/en/
Apple (2017) App Store Review Guidelines. https://developer.apple.com/
app-store/review/guidelines/
Bird S, Klein E, Loper E (2009) Natural Language Processing with Python, 1st
edn. O’Reilly Media, Inc.
Calefato F, Lanubile F, Novielli N (2017) Emotxt: A toolkit for emotion recognition
from text. arXiv preprint arXiv:170803892
Carreno LVG, Winbladh K (2013) Analysis of user comments: An approach for
software requirements evolution. In: 2013 35th International Conference on Soft-
ware Engineering (ICSE), pp 582–591, DOI 10.1109/ICSE.2013.6606604
Chawla NV, Japkowicz N, Kotcz A (2004) Special issue on learning from imbal-
anced data sets. ACM Sigkdd Explorations Newsletter 6(1):1–6
Chen N, Lin J, Hoi SCH, Xiao X, Zhang B (2014) Ar-miner: Mining informative
reviews for developers from mobile app marketplace. In: Proceedings of the 36th
International Conference on Software Engineering, ACM, New York, NY, USA,
ICSE 2014, pp 767–778, DOI 10.1145/2568225.2568263, URL http://doi.acm.
org/10.1145/2568225.2568263
Cohen J (1988) Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences. Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates
Cortes C, Vapnik V (1995) Support-vector networks. Machine Learning 20(3):273–
297, DOI 10.1007/BF00994018, URL https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00994018
Dickerson JP, Kagan V, Subrahmanian VS (2014) Using sentiment to detect bots
on twitter: Are humans more opinionated than bots? In: 2014 IEEE/ACM In-
ternational Conference on Advances in Social Networks Analysis and Mining
(ASONAM 2014), pp 620–627, DOI 10.1109/ASONAM.2014.6921650
DigitalTrends (2018) Can you really trust app store ratings? We
asked the experts. https://www.digitaltrends.com/android/
can-you-really-trust-app-store-ratings/
Drummond C, Holte RC, et al. (2003) C4. 5, class imbalance, and cost sensitiv-
ity: why under-sampling beats over-sampling. In: Workshop on learning from
imbalanced datasets II, Citeseer, vol 11, pp 1–8
Fakespot (2017) Fakespot. http://fakespot.com
Feng S, Xing L, Gogar A, Choi Y (2012) Distributional footprints of deceptive
product reviews. ICWSM 12:98–105
Ferrara E, Varol O, Davis CA, Menczer F, Flammini A (2014) The rise of social
bots. CoRR abs/1407.5225, URL http://arxiv.org/abs/1407.5225
Towards Understanding and Detecting Fake Reviews in App Stores 41
Finkelstein A, Harman M, Jia Y, Martin W, Sarro F, Zhang Y (2017) Investi-
gating the relationship between price, rating, and popularity in the blackberry
world app store. Information and Software Technology 87:119 – 139, DOI https:
//doi.org/10.1016/j.infsof.2017.03.002, URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/
science/article/pii/S095058491730215X
Fritz CO, Morris PE, Richler JJ (2012) Effect size estimates: current use, calcula-
tions, and interpretation. Journal of experimental psychology: General 141(1):2
Fu B, Lin J, Li L, Faloutsos C, Hong J, Sadeh N (2013) Why people hate your
app: Making sense of user feedback in a mobile app store. In: Proceedings of the
19th ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data
mining, ACM, pp 1276–1284
Gao C, Xu H, Hu J, Zhou Y (2015) Ar-tracker: Track the dynamics of mobile apps
via user review mining. In: 2015 IEEE Symposium on Service-Oriented System
Engineering (SOSE), IEEE, pp 284–290
Google (2017) Google Play User Ratings, Reviews, and Installs. https://play.
google.com/about/storelisting-promotional/ratings-reviews-installs/
Google (2018) Google Play Prohibited and Restricted Content. https://support.
google.com/contributionpolicy/answer/7400114
Google (2019) In reviews we trust - Making Google Play ratings and reviews
more trustworthy. https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2018/12/
in-reviews-we-trust-making-google-play.html
Guzman E, Maalej W (2014) How do users like this feature? a fine grained senti-
ment analysis of app reviews. In: 2014 IEEE 22nd International Requirements
Engineering Conference (RE), pp 153–162, DOI 10.1109/RE.2014.6912257
Gyongyi Z, Garcia-Molina H (2005) Web spam taxonomy. In: First international
workshop on adversarial information retrieval on the web (AIRWeb 2005)
Harman M, Jia Y, Zhang Y (2012) App store mining and analysis: MSR for app
stores. In: 2012 9th IEEE Working Conference on Mining Software Repositories
(MSR 2012), IEEE, pp 108–111, DOI 10.1109/MSR.2012.6224306, URL http:
//ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6224306/
Ho TK (1995) Random decision forests. In: Proceedings of the Third International
Conference on Document Analysis and Recognition (Volume 1) - Volume 1,
IEEE Computer Society, Washington, DC, USA, ICDAR ’95, pp 278–, URL
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=844379.844681
Hoon L, Vasa R, Schneider JG, Grundy J, et al. (2013) An analysis of the mo-
bile app review landscape: trends and implications. Faculty of Information and
Communication Technologies, Swinburne University of Technology, Tech Rep
Iacob C, Harrison R (2013) Retrieving and analyzing mobile apps feature requests
from online reviews. In: 2013 10th Working Conference on Mining Software
Repositories (MSR), pp 41–44, DOI 10.1109/MSR.2013.6624001
Iacob C, Veerappa V, Harrison R (2013) What are you complaining about?: A
study of online reviews of mobile applications. In: Proceedings of the 27th
International BCS Human Computer Interaction Conference, British Com-
puter Society, Swinton, UK, UK, BCS-HCI ’13, pp 29:1–29:6, URL http:
//dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2578048.2578086
Iacob C, Harrison R, Faily S (2014) Online Reviews as First Class Artifacts in
Mobile App Development. In: Memmi G, Blanke U (eds) Mobile Computing,
Applications, and Services, Springer International Publishing, Cham, pp 47–53
42 Daniel Martens, Walid Maalej
Jindal N, Liu B (2008) Opinion spam and analysis. In: Proceedings of the 2008
International Conference on Web Search and Data Mining, ACM, New York,
NY, USA, WSDM ’08, pp 219–230, DOI 10.1145/1341531.1341560, URL http:
//doi.acm.org/10.1145/1341531.1341560
Johann T, Stanik C, B AMA, Maalej W (2017) Safe: A simple approach for fea-
ture extraction from app descriptions and app reviews. In: 2017 IEEE 25th
International Requirements Engineering Conference (RE), pp 21–30, DOI
10.1109/RE.2017.71
Khalid H (2013) On identifying user complaints of ios apps. In: Proceedings of the
2013 International Conference on Software Engineering, IEEE Press, Piscat-
away, NJ, USA, ICSE ’13, pp 1474–1476, URL http://dl.acm.org/citation.
cfm?id=2486788.2487044
Lee K, Caverlee J, Webb S (2010) Uncovering social spammers: Social honey-
pots + machine learning. In: Proceedings of the 33rd International ACM SIGIR
Conference on Research and Development in Information Retrieval, ACM, New
York, NY, USA, SIGIR ’10, pp 435–442, DOI 10.1145/1835449.1835522, URL
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1835449.1835522
Luca M, Zervas G (2016) Fake It Till You Make It: Reputation, Competition, and
Yelp Review Fraud. Management Science 62(12):3412–3427
Maalej W, Kurtanovic´ Z, Nabil H, Stanik C (2016a) On the automatic classifi-
cation of app reviews. Requirements Engineering 21(3):311–331, DOI 10.1007/
s00766-016-0251-9, URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00766-016-0251-9
Maalej W, Nayebi M, Johann T, Ruhe G (2016b) Toward data-driven requirements
engineering. IEEE Software 33(1):48–54, DOI 10.1109/MS.2015.153
Martens D, Johann T (2017) On the emotion of users in app reviews. In: Pro-
ceedings of the 2Nd International Workshop on Emotion Awareness in Software
Engineering, IEEE Press, Piscataway, NJ, USA, SEmotion ’17, pp 8–14, DOI 10.
1109/SEmotion.2017...6, URL https://doi.org/10.1109/SEmotion.2017...6
Martin W, Harman M, Jia Y, Sarro F, Zhang Y (2015) The app sampling problem
for app store mining. In: Proceedings of the 12th Working Conference on Mining
Software Repositories, IEEE Press, Piscataway, NJ, USA, MSR ’15, pp 123–133,
URL http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2820518.2820535
Martin W, Sarro F, Jia Y, Zhang Y, Harman M (2016) A Survey of App Store
Analysis for Software Engineering. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
PP(99):1–1, DOI 10.1109/TSE.2016.2630689, URL http://ieeexplore.ieee.
org/document/7765038/
Mukherjee A, Venkataraman V, Liu B, Glance N (2013a) Fake review detection:
Classification and analysis of real and pseudo reviews
Mukherjee A, Venkataraman V, Liu B, Glance NS (2013b) What yelp fake review
filter might be doing? In: ICWSM
Nayebi M, Ruhe G (2017) Optimized functionality for super mobile apps. In: 2017
IEEE 25th International Requirements Engineering Conference (RE), pp 388–
393, DOI 10.1109/RE.2017.72
Nayebi M, Marbouti M, Quapp R, Maurer F, Ruhe G (2017) Crowdsourced ex-
ploration of mobile app features: A case study of the fort mcmurray wild-
fire. In: 2017 IEEE/ACM 39th International Conference on Software Engi-
neering: Software Engineering in Society Track (ICSE-SEIS), pp 57–66, DOI
10.1109/ICSE-SEIS.2017.8
Towards Understanding and Detecting Fake Reviews in App Stores 43
Oh J, Kim D, Lee U, Lee JG, Song J (2013) Facilitating developer-user inter-
actions with mobile app review digests. In: CHI ’13 Extended Abstracts on
Human Factors in Computing Systems, ACM, New York, NY, USA, CHI EA
’13, pp 1809–1814, DOI 10.1145/2468356.2468681, URL http://doi.acm.org/
10.1145/2468356.2468681
Ott M, Choi Y, Cardie C, Hancock JT (2011) Finding deceptive opinion spam by
any stretch of the imagination. In: Proceedings of the 49th Annual Meeting of the
Association for Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies - Vol-
ume 1, Association for Computational Linguistics, Stroudsburg, PA, USA, HLT
’11, pp 309–319, URL http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2002472.2002512
Pagano D, Bru¨gge B (2013) User involvement in software evolution practice: A
case study. In: Proceedings of the 2013 International Conference on Software
Engineering, IEEE Press, Piscataway, NJ, USA, ICSE ’13, pp 953–962, URL
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2486788.2486920
Pagano D, Maalej W (2013) User feedback in the appstore - An empirical study. RE
pp 125–134, DOI 10.1109/RE.2013.6636712, URL http://ieeexplore.ieee.
org/document/6636712/
Palomba F, Linares-Vsquez M, Bavota G, Oliveto R, Penta MD, Poshyvanyk D,
Lucia AD (2015) User reviews matter! tracking crowdsourced reviews to support
evolution of successful apps. In: 2015 IEEE International Conference on Software
Maintenance and Evolution (ICSME), pp 291–300, DOI 10.1109/ICSM.2015.
7332475
Panichella S, Sorbo AD, Guzman E, Visaggio CA, Canfora G, Gall HC (2015)
How can i improve my app? classifying user reviews for software maintenance
and evolution. In: 2015 IEEE International Conference on Software Maintenance
and Evolution (ICSME), pp 281–290, DOI 10.1109/ICSM.2015.7332474
Park D, Sachar S, Diakopoulos N, Elmqvist N (2016) Supporting comment mod-
erators in identifying high quality online news comments. In: Proceedings of the
2016 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, ACM, New
York, NY, USA, CHI ’16, pp 1114–1125, DOI 10.1145/2858036.2858389, URL
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2858036.2858389
Pedregosa F, Varoquaux G, Gramfort A, Michel V, Thirion B, Grisel O, Blondel
M, Prettenhofer P, Weiss R, Dubourg V, Vanderplas J, Passos A, Cournapeau
D, Brucher M, Perrot M, Duchesnay E (2011) Scikit-learn: Machine learning in
Python. Journal of Machine Learning Research 12:2825–2830
Saito H, Toyoda M, Kitsuregawa M, Aihara K (2007) A large-scale study of link
spam detection by graph algorithms. In: Proceedings of the 3rd international
workshop on Adversarial information retrieval on the web, ACM, pp 45–48
SciKit (2018) SciKit Learn: 4.3. Preprocessing data. http://scikit-learn.org/
stable/modules/preprocessing.html
Seneviratne S, Seneviratne A, Kaafar MA, Mahanti A, Mohapatra P (2017)
Spam mobile apps: Characteristics, detection, and in the wild analysis. ACM
Trans Web 11(1):4:1–4:29, DOI 10.1145/3007901, URL http://doi.acm.org/
10.1145/3007901
Stringhini G, Wang G, Egele M, Kruegel C, Vigna G, Zheng H, Zhao BY (2013)
Follow the green: Growth and dynamics in twitter follower markets. In: Proceed-
ings of the 2013 Conference on Internet Measurement Conference, ACM, New
York, NY, USA, IMC ’13, pp 163–176, DOI 10.1145/2504730.2504731, URL
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2504730.2504731
44 Daniel Martens, Walid Maalej
Subrahmanian VS, Azaria A, Durst S, Kagan V, Galstyan A, Lerman K, Zhu
L, Ferrara E, Flammini A, Menczer F, Waltzman R, Stevens A, Dekhtyar A,
Gao S, Hogg T, Kooti F, Liu Y, Varol O, Shiralkar P, Vydiswaran VGV, Mei
Q, Huang T (2016) The DARPA twitter bot challenge. CoRR abs/1601.05140,
URL http://arxiv.org/abs/1601.05140
Sussin J, Thompson E (2018) The Consequences of Fake Fans, Likes
and Reviews on Social Networks. https://www.gartner.com/doc/2091515/
consequences-fake-fans-likes-reviews
Svedic Z (2015) The Effect of Informational Signals on Mobile Apps Sales Ranks
Across the Globe
Times NY (2017) Buy Reviews on Yelp, Get Black Mark. http://www.nytimes.
com/2012/10/18/technology/yelp-tries-to-halt-deceptive-reviews.html
Torgo L (2010) Data Mining with R: Learning with Case Studies, 1st edn. Chap-
man & Hall/CRC
Villarroel L, Bavota G, Russo B, Oliveto R, Penta MD (2016) Release planning
of mobile apps based on user reviews. In: 2016 IEEE/ACM 38th International
Conference on Software Engineering (ICSE), pp 14–24, DOI 10.1145/2884781.
2884818
Wang S, Minku LL, Yao X (2018) A systematic study of online class imbalance
learning with concept drift. IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks and Learn-
ing Systems 29(10):4802–4821, DOI 10.1109/TNNLS.2017.2771290
